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THE RISE OF UNNECESSARY
CONSTITUTIONAL RULINGS
THOMAS HEALY*
One of the oldest principles of constitutional adjudication is that
federal courts will decide only those constitutional questions that
are necessary to the resolution of cases or controversies. This
principle provides a key justification for judicial review and
underlies much of the law of justiciability. Yet in recent years, the
Supreme Court has systematically departed from this principle by
authorizing (and in some cases, ordering) lower federal courts to
decide constitutional questions even when doing so is clearly not
necessary to the resolution of a case.
This Article provides the first account of this troubling development
and examines it from several perspectives. The Article begins by
arguing that the rise of unnecessary constitutional rulings is both
part of a larger trend toward judicial supremacy and the result of
pressures specific to each of the areas in which the Court has
authorized such rulings. It then considers whether the Court's
embrace of unnecessary constitutional rulings in four areas-
qualified immunity, habeas corpus, harmless error, and Fourth
Amendment "good faith" cases--can be squared with Article IlI's
ban on advisory opinions, which prohibits federal courts from
deciding legal questions that will have no effect on a dispute
between adverse litigants. Finally, the Article considers whether the
Court's recent approach, even if consistent with Article III, is good
policy. Although several scholars have advocated unnecessary
constitutional rulings in qualified immunity cases as a way to ensure
the evolution of new rights, the Article shows that these rulings are
far more likely to retard than promote the development of
constitutional rights.
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. J.D. Columbia. I am grateful
for the helpful comments of Michelle Adams, Jake Barnes, Arlene Chow, Michael Dorf,
Edward Hartnett, Henry Monaghan, Banu Ramachandran, Charles Sullivan, and the
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Antoniou, Mayling Blanco, and Matthew Conley for excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
For as long as federal courts have been interpreting the
Constitution, they have been assuring us that they do so only out of
necessity. From John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison' to
the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore,2 the federal courts-and in
particular the Supreme Court-have repeatedly insisted that
resolving the many ambiguities of the Constitution is a responsibility
that comes with their duty to decide cases and is not one they seek
out.' "If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
3. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 ("Those who apply the rule to particular
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the process of constitutional adjudication," the Court has often
stated, "it is that we ought not to pass on questions of
constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable. '4 The
Court's reluctance to decide constitutional questions that are not
necessary to the resolution of cases and controversies has influenced
many of its most important jurisdictional and jurisprudential
doctrines. It informs much of the law of abstention, particularly the
branch known as Pullman abstention.' It has figured prominently in
the development of the political question and other justiciability
doctrines.6 And it underlies the familiar canon that the courts should
construe statutes so as to avoid difficult constitutional questions.7
Of course, the Court has never followed the principle of
constitutional avoidance to the letter. Even in Marbury, Chief Justice
Marshall went out of his way to address several matters that were not
strictly necessary to the resolution of the case.' And he apparently
gave no consideration to the possibility that a narrow construction of
the Judiciary Act might have averted the issue of judicial review
entirely.' Later courts also have reached constitutional questions that
cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule."); Bush, 531 U.S. at 111
(describing the Court's decision to hear the 2000 presidential election dispute as an
"unsought responsibility"); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400
(1819) (describing the Court's "awful responsibility" to decide constitutional questions).
4. Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343
(1999) (quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944));
Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549,570 n.34 (1947) (same).
5. See R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (holding that federal
courts should abstain from deciding a case when a state court's clarification of uncertain
state law might make ruling on a constitutional issue unnecessary).
6. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"
and Article I1, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 211 (1992) (noting that many of the justiciability
doctrines-standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions-can be understood as an
effort to exemplify the relevant "passive virtues").
7. See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173
(2001) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." (citation omitted)).
8. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1800-01 (1991). For instance, the
Court held that Marbury had a right to the commission he sought and that the laws of the
country afforded him a remedy even though those decisions were unnecessary because the
Court found that the specific remedy Marbury sought-a writ of mandamus-was beyond
the Court's original jurisdiction. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162-74.
9. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DuKE L.J. 1, 30 (1969) (arguing that Marshall could have construed the Judiciary Act so
as to avoid deciding whether the Constitution gives federal courts the power of judicial
review); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword. The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 57 (1961) (same). But see James E. Pfander, Marbury,
Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
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did not lie squarely in the path of decision. In Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authorityl0 -a case made notable by Justice
Brandeis's emphatic endorsement of the avoidance principle in a
concurring opinion-the Court addressed the constitutionality of the
Wilson Dam even though, in Brandeis's view, there was no need to
reach that issue. 1 Still, such cases have mainly been aberrations,
driven by unusual circumstances or the desire to reach a particular
result. For the most part, the Court has adhered to the principle that,
whenever possible, the resolution of constitutional questions should
be put off for another day.
In several areas, however, the Court has recently departed from
this principle. Instead of delaying the adjudication of constitutional
issues until the last possible moment, the Court has reached out to
decide constitutional questions even when doing so is clearly not
necessary to the outcome of the case. Moreover, the Court has
ordered lower federal courts to follow the same approach in similar
cases. In Saucier v. Katz,'12 for instance, the Court held that when
considering claims of qualified immunity, federal courts should first
determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a
constitutional right before deciding whether the right was clearly
established at the time of the events giving rise to the lawsuit.13
Because a government official has qualified immunity if the right was
not clearly established, lower courts had usually proceeded straight to
that question, reasoning that to decide whether the right exists at all
would be an unnecessary constitutional ruling.14 But the Court
rejected that approach, stating that lower courts "must" decide
whether the constitutional right exists, even when they subsequently
dismiss the case because the right was not clearly established. 5
According to the Court, this procedure will enable federal judges to
clarify standards of official conduct and set forth constitutional
principles that "will become the basis for a holding that a right is
clearly established" in subsequent cases.16
1515, 1531-49 (2001) (defending Marshall's interpretation of the Judiciary Act as
consistent with contemporary views of that Act).
10. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
11. Id. at 341 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
12. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
13. Id. at 200-01.
14. See infra Part I.B.1.
15. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01.
16. Id. at 201; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 n.5 (1998)
(explaining that the Court's approach to qualified immunity cases is to determine first
whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of his or her constitutional rights).
850 [Vol. 83
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The Court has endorsed a similar procedure in cases involving
harmless constitutional error. In Lockhart v. Fretwell,7 the Court
rejected a common practice among lower courts, which had been to
assume that a constitutional error occurred and skip to the question
of whether the error was harmless. 8 As in qualified immunity cases,
many courts thought there was no reason to decide the difficult
constitutional question if the error was harmless anyway.19 But the
Court thought otherwise: "Harmless-error analysis," it stated in
Fretwell, "is triggered only after the reviewing court discovers that an
error has been committed. ' 20
In some contexts, the Court, while not dictating that lower
federal courts follow a particular procedure, has nonetheless
suggested that it would be appropriate to resolve constitutional
questions unnecessary to the outcome of the case. Consider United
States v. Leon,21 in which the Court ruled that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search should not be excluded at trial if the officer
relied in good faith on a search warrant later found invalid.22 As a
result of this decision, the key issue in many cases is whether the
officer reasonably believed the warrant was constitutional, not
whether it actually was. Yet the Court did not warn lower federal
courts against deciding the constitutional issue in cases where the
officer acted in good faith. Instead of adopting this "inflexible
practice," the Court stated, lower courts are free to reach the merits
of the constitutional claim even when doing so is unnecessary because
the officer's belief was reasonable.23 When the Court later extended
Leon to cases in which an officer conducts a search in reasonable
reliance upon a statute later declared unconstitutional, it once again
made clear that a finding that an officer acted in good faith would not
"preclude review of the constitutionality of the search or seizure. "24
Some lower federal courts have expressed dismay about the
Court's willingness to issue unnecessary constitutional rulings. When
the Court first recommended the procedure for deciding qualified
immunity cases that it later mandated in Saucier, the Second Circuit
17. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
18. See infra Part I.B.4.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Pravato, 505 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1974) (refusing to
address right to privacy claim upon concluding that admission of evidence received during
search was harmless).
20. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 370 n.2.
21. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
22. Id. at 926.
23. See id. at 924-25.
24. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 353-54 (1987).
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hesitated to follow it.25  Citing the long tradition of constitutional
avoidance, the Second Circuit reasoned that the Court must have
intended for the new procedure to be followed only where (1) it was
obvious that the constitutional right did not exist, and (2) the
constitutional issue would otherwise never be resolved because of the
plaintiff's inability to sue for injunctive relief (qualified immunity bars
only suits for money damages).26 But Saucier made clear that lower
courts must decide the constitutional issue first and that the new
procedure should be followed even when the constitutional question
is difficult and injunctive relief is readily available.27
Other courts have embraced the Supreme Court's approach and
have applied it in new contexts. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has
cited the Court's qualified immunity cases as support for its
procedural approach in habeas cases.21 Under the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a federal court may
grant habeas relief to a state prisoner only if the state court judgment
was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.29 As a result of
AEDPA, federal courts need not decide whether the state court
decision was wrong, only whether it was contrary to clearly
established federal law. But the Ninth Circuit disapproves of that
approach. It has held that lower courts must first determine whether
the state court judgment was incorrect and only then decide whether
the petitioner is entitled to habeas relief under AEDPA.30 The Ninth
Circuit acknowledges that a decision on the merits of the state court
judgment is not binding on state courts and can never form the basis
for a habeas challenge under AEDPA. 1 But citing the Supreme
25. See Mollica v. Volker, 229 F.3d 366, 371-72 (2d Cir. 2000); Horne v. Coughlin, 178
F.3d 603, 604-06 (2d Cir. 1999).
26. See Coughlin, 178 F.3d at 605-06.
27. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001) ("A court required to rule upon
the qualified immunity question must consider, then, this threshold question: taken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's
conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry." (emphasis
added)). Shortly before publication of this Article, three Supreme Court Justices
expressed uneasiness with the approach mandated by Saucier. See Brosseau v. Haugen,
125 S. Ct. 596, 601 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) (expressing concern that Saucier "rigidly
requires courts unnecessarily to decide difficult constitutional questions when there is
available an easier basis for the decision" and urging reconsideration of the Saucier
approach). But a majority of the Court has thus far declined to reconsider the issue. See
id. at 598 n.3.
28. See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
30. See Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1155.
31. See id. at 1154.
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Court's qualified immunity cases, it says its approach "promotes
clarity in our own constitutional jurisprudence and also provides
guidance for state courts, which can look to our decisions for their
persuasive value.
32
The Supreme Court recently rejected the Ninth Circuit's ruling
that district courts must decide the merits of the state court decision
before applying the AEDPA standard.33  But it conspicuously left
open the possibility that federal courts could choose to decide
whether the state court decision was wrong in a given case.34
Moreover, the Court has followed this procedure itself under
AEDPA, first deciding whether the state court misinterpreted the
Constitution and only then deciding whether the state court judgment
was contrary to clearly established federal law.35 Thus, the Court
appears to have authorized unnecessary constitutional rulings in
habeas cases as well.
The Court's embrace of unnecessary constitutional rulings in
these four areas has gone almost completely unnoticed. Although a
few scholars have discussed the Court's approach in qualified
immunity cases,36 no one has identified the Court's broader embrace
of unnecessary constitutional rulings or examined the implications of
this development. This is a serious oversight. The rise of unnecessary
constitutional rulings is in significant tension with the long-established
premises of federal court jurisdiction. In its rejection of advisory
opinions, its refusal to adjudicate political questions, and its stringent
standing requirements, the Supreme Court traditionally has rejected
the view of federal courts as roving expositors of constitutional norms
in favor of a dispute resolution model in which the exclusive function
of the federal courts-at least at the lower levels-is to decide cases
and controversies.37 So what accounts for the Court's apparent
change of attitude? And can it be reconciled with the constraints of
32. Id. at 1155.
33. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003).
34. See id. at 71 ("AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one
methodology in deciding the only question that matters under § 2254(d)(1)-whether a
state court decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law.").
35. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225,237 (2000).
36. For discussions about the impact of the Court's qualified immunity approach on
the development of substantive constitutional law, see generally John M.M. Greabe,
Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary" Constitutional Rulings in Civil Rights
Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1999); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and
the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1 (2002).
37. See FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 67-74 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Article III and the long tradition of avoiding constitutional
adjudication?
In this Article, I attempt to answer both questions. I begin in
Part I by explaining that the Court's embrace of unnecessary
constitutional rulings is part of a larger trend in which the Court has
gradually squeezed the other branches of government out of the
business of constitutional interpretation and has come to view its own
role primarily as the articulation of constitutional principles rather
than the arbitration of ordinary disputes. This trend, which began
with the shift to certiorari discretion in the early twentieth century,
can be seen in the Court's careful management of its docket and
stated preference for cases that pose important and far-reaching
questions of law.38 It is also evident in the decline of the political
question doctrine and in the weakening of other justiciability
requirements, such as mootness. Finally, this trend is reflected in the
diminished deference the Court has shown Congress over the past
decade and in its refusal to allow Congress to provide broader
constitutional protections than those announced from the bench.
Part I also argues that the Court's approval of unnecessary
constitutional rulings can be seen, to some degree, as an effort to
preserve opportunities for the federal courts to develop constitutional
norms. In each of the areas in which such rulings have been
authorized-qualified immunity, habeas corpus, harmless
constitutional error, and Fourth Amendment good faith cases-
earlier developments limited the opportunities for federal courts to
directly interpret the Constitution. The evolution of qualified
immunity, for instance, shifted emphasis away from the constitutional
issues in civil rights actions and toward the sub-constitutional
question of whether the right asserted by the plaintiff was clearly
established. The enactment of AEDPA likewise limited judicial
interpretation of the Constitution, forcing courts to focus only on
principles clearly established by the Supreme Court. The current
Court undoubtedly supports doctrines such as qualified immunity and
AEDPA that shield government officials from the consequences of
their unconstitutional conduct. But given its recent assertions of
judicial supremacy and its growing acceptance of the norm
declaration model, the Court may be troubled by the way these
doctrines limit the federal courts' role in constitutional interpretation.
If so, its embrace of unnecessary constitutional rulings may be, in
part, an attempt to remedy the situation.
38. See SuP. Cr. R. 10.
[Vol. 83854
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After setting forth this descriptive account of the Court's recent
approach to unnecessary constitutional rulings, Part II explores a
question that the Court and most scholars have overlooked: whether
this approach violates Article III's ban on advisory opinions.39 One of
the underlying principles of the ban on advisory opinions is that
federal courts may issue only rulings that have some effect on the
resolution'of a dispute between adverse parties.40 This principle is
reflected in the rule that a plaintiff lacks standing unless he can show
that his injury will be redressed by a favorable ruling.41 It is also seen
in the mootness doctrine, which requires federal courts to dismiss
cases when a dispute has been resolved such that a legal ruling is not
likely to make any difference. 42 In addition, the principle that federal
courts may issue only rulings that have some effect can be seen in the
Adequate and Independent State Grounds doctrine ("the State
Grounds doctrine"). Under this doctrine, the Court has held that it
lacks jurisdiction to review state court rulings on issues of federal law
if the state court judgment rests on an adequate and independent
state law ground. "If the same judgment would be rendered by the
state court after we corrected its views of federal law," the Court has
explained, "our review could amount to nothing more than an
advisory opinion."43
The principle that federal courts may issue only rulings that have
some effect raises serious questions about the practice of deciding the
constitutional merits in qualified immunity, habeas corpus, harmless
error, and Fourth Amendment good faith cases. In these cases, a
ruling on the constitutional merits often has no effect because the
court's determination that the governmental actor has immunity or
that an error was harmless is adequate to resolve the dispute. One
might respond that a court cannot know whether its resolution of the
39. John Greabe has argued that unnecessary constitutional rulings in qualified
immunity cases do not violate Article III. See Greabe, supra note 36, at 418-26. But he
has not examined unnecessary constitutional rulings in the other areas under discussion
here. And, as will become apparent in Part II, I disagree with his conclusions with respect
to qualified immunity.
40. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.2, at 51-54 (4th ed.
2003).
41. See id. § 2.2 at 54.
42. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) ("[Flederal courts are
without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case
before them."); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895) (stating that a federal court has no
authority "to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in
the case before it").
43. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983) (quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. 117, 126 (1945)).
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merits will have some effect until after it decides the question of
immunity or harmlessness. Therefore, as long as the court decides
the merits first, its ruling will not be advisory. But as I show in Part
II, a separate ruling on the merits in qualified immunity and habeas
cases is never necessary to resolve the dispute and can never change
the outcome of the case. A ruling on the merits can sometimes affect
the outcome in harmless error and Fourth Amendment good faith
cases, and a court will not know one way or another until after it
decides the issue of harmlessness or good faith. But this does not
eliminate the Article III problem. In cases involving the State
Grounds doctrine, it is also unclear whether a ruling on the federal
question will have some effect until after the Court determines
whether the state court judgment rests on an adequate and
independent state ground. Yet the Court does not allow itself to
avoid the ban on advisory opinions simply by deciding the federal
issue first. Instead, the Court first determines whether the state court
judgment rests on adequate and independent state grounds. Only if it
does not-in other words, only if the Court's decision on the federal
issue can affect the outcome of the case-will the Court decide the
federal issue.
Despite these arguments, there are good reasons to conclude that
unnecessary constitutional rulings-at least in harmless error and
Fourth Amendment good faith cases-do not violate the ban on
advisory opinions. For one thing, scholars have heavily criticized the
State Grounds doctrine itself and have argued that it is not required
by Article III. 4 More importantly, the practice of deciding the
constitutional issue in these cases does not undermine the values
served by the ban on advisory opinions. Because the constitutional
issues are still presented in the context of a concrete dispute between
adverse parties, there is little danger that the Court will issue
hypothetical legal judgments or that its rulings will not be viewed as
final and authoritative by the other branches of government. The
same thing is not true in qualified immunity and habeas cases,
however. Because a ruling on the constitutional issue in these cases
can never affect the outcome, there is a greater risk that the issue will
not be argued vigorously and that the Court's decision will therefore
be inadequately informed. For that reason, I conclude that
unnecessary constitutional rulings in these two areas violate the ban
44. See Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal
Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds
Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1301-10 (1986).
[Vol. 83
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on advisory opinions.
Even if the Court's practice of reaching constitutional questions
unnecessarily in some contexts is permissible under Article III, we
might still question whether it is good policy. The principle of
constitutional avoidance has a long and distinguished pedigree and is
grounded in the recognition that constitutional interpretation and
judicial review are delicate functions. In Part III, I explore the
foundations of this principle and the ways it has been manifested over
the past two centuries. I then consider whether, in light of this
tradition, the Court's recent approach can be justified. The most
prominent justification for the Court's approach is that it ensures the
continued evolution of constitutional rights.15  By reaching
constitutional issues even in cases where a non-constitutional issue is
dispositive, courts are able to articulate new constitutional rights that
will benefit later litigants. This is especially important in areas such
as qualified immunity and habeas corpus, where relief can be granted
only if the right has been clearly established.
Although this is a powerful justification for unnecessary
constitutional rulings, it overlooks an important consideration. When
a court reaches out to decide the constitutional issue, it will not
necessarily rule that the right exists. As I argue in Part III, a court
deciding the constitutional issue in one of these cases is just as likely
to decide that the constitutional right does not exist. In fact, my
review of qualified immunity cases over two years shows that
appellate courts ruled against plaintiffs asserting the existence of a
constitutional right far more often than they ruled in favor of them.
One might argue that this is irrelevant because a ruling that a right
does not exist leaves future litigants no worse off than a ruling that
the right is not clearly established; either way, they will be denied
relief. But such rulings do harm future criminal defendants and civil
rights plaintiffs seeking equitable relief, since they are entitled to
relief as long as the right exists, even if it is not clearly established.
Such rulings also may have a domino effect, leading to the denial of
constitutional rights in analogous situations. Finally, a ruling that a
right does not exist authorizes government officials to engage in
conduct they otherwise might have avoided for fear of jeopardizing
criminal convictions. Some might welcome this development,
believing that law enforcement has been unnecessarily shackled by
45. See Greabe, supra note 36, at 433-34; Kamin, supra note 36, at 4 (noting that the
failure to reach constitutional questions can serve "to hamper the recovery of those who
have suffered constitutional wrongs and to prevent the development of constitutional
law").
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uncertainty about what is constitutionally permissible. But for those
who support unnecessary constitutional rulings out of concern for the
rights of criminal defendants and civil rights plaintiffs, this is likely to
be unwelcome news.
I do not deny that permitting unnecessary constitutional rulings
in certain contexts may also have benefits. My point is simply that the
sword is double-edged and that courts may use the opportunity to
issue unnecessary constitutional rulings both to expand and to contain
constitutional rights. This point is fairly intuitive, but it needs
restating occasionally. People who came of age during or after the
Warren era tend to associate an aggressive approach to federal court
jurisdiction with a liberal, rights-expanding agenda. But activism is
neutral. It can be used to achieve whatever ends are desired by those
who engage in it, and that should give pause to those who, out of
affinity for the Warren Court, have instinctually applauded the
Rehnquist Court's approval of unnecessary constitutional rulings.
I. UNNECESSARY CONSTITUTIONAL RULINGS: A DESCRIPTIVE
ACCOUNT
Whatever one thinks of the Court's recent approach to
unnecessary constitutional rulings, it is a clear departure both from
the Court's rhetoric and its long tradition of avoiding constitutional
questions. The first question to be addressed, therefore, is what
accounts for this departure. In this Part, I provide two possible
explanations. In Section A, I argue that the Court's recent embrace
of unnecessary constitutional rulings is part of a larger trend in which
the Court has gradually shifted from a dispute resolution model to a
norm declaration model and has asserted the exclusive competence of
the federal judiciary to interpret the Constitution. Section B then
proposes a more particularized explanation, which is that the Court's
embrace of unnecessary constitutional rulings can be seen, at least in
part, as a response to developments that have limited the opportunity
of federal courts to engage in constitutional analysis. Though neither
of these explanations is intended to justify the Court's recent
approach, they shed light on the conceits and concerns motivating the
rise of unnecessary constitutional rulings.
A. A Court Supreme
Perhaps at no time since the height of the Warren era has the
Supreme Court been criticized so widely for what critics perceive as a
pattern of judicial activism and arrogance. In the past several years,
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numerous writers have called attention to the Rehnquist Court's
diminishing deference to the constitutional judgments of Congress
and growing confidence in its own ability to tackle difficult national
questions.46 Whether this drift toward judicial supremacy can be
justified is an important and engaging question, but not one I address
here. Instead, my more modest goal is to sketch the highlights of this
general trend and explain its relationship to the specific issue of
unnecessary constitutional rulings. I begin by discussing the Court's
move to a discretionary docket and how this has affected the Court's
self-image. I then discuss several more recent developments: the
decline of the political question doctrine, the weakening of the
mootness doctrine, and the Court's diminished deference to
Congressional judgments.
1. Docket Discretion
While contemporary discussions of judicial supremacy focus on
the Rehnquist Court, the seeds of the modem trend were planted a
century ago with a series of laws that gave the Court nearly complete
control over its docket. 7 Prior to this period, the Court was obligated
to hear whatever cases Congress included within its jurisdiction. But
beginning in 1891 and culminating in the Judges' Bill of 1925,
Congress ceded control over the Court's docket to the justices
themselves, so that with a few exceptions the Court was free to hear
(or decline to hear) any case within its appellate jurisdiction. 8 The
Court subsequently strengthened this discretion by declining to hear
selected cases within its original jurisdiction, choosing to decide
particular questions in a petition for certiorari rather than the whole
46. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1092-93, 1106 (2001) (claiming that we are living through
a "constitutional revolution" and describing the Rehnquist Court as "an institution run
dangerously amok, heedless of sound legal standards, and determined, by hook or by
crook, to impose its preferred political views upon" the country); Rachel E. Barkow, More
Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 302-19 (2002); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1273-78 (2001); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S.
Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An
Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1718-27 (2002); Larry D. Kramer, The
Supreme Court 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13-14 (2001);
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the
Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 905-07 (2003); Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as
Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2005-10 (2003).
47. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five
Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 passim (2000).
48. See id. at 1649-60, 1704.
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case, and discouraging the courts of appeals from certifying questions
for Supreme Court resolution.49
The transition to a discretionary docket has significantly altered
the Court's conception of itself. Under the prior system, the Court
could plausibly view itself as merely another judicial body-albeit
with final say-whose primary purpose was to decide ordinary
disputes. But with nearly absolute control over which cases it hears
and which issues it decides within those cases, that view of the Court's
role is no longer credible. A court that is not required to decide any
particular case-or any cases at all, with a few exceptions-can hardly
see itself as just another court resolving cases and controversies.
Instead, the Court has come to view itself as a unique institution with
a special role in articulating constitutional norms and resolving the
country's deepest cultural and political disputes.50
The Court's changing image of itself has, in turn, affected the
way it exercises its certiorari discretion. The Court no longer decides
all cases presenting non-frivolous constitutional issues, as it assured
Congress it would during debates over the Judges' Bill. Instead, it
decides only those cases presenting important and far-reaching
questions of law.52 It also carefully allots its resources and engages in
the type of agenda-setting more commonly associated with the
political branches.53 The Rehnquist Court, for instance, has reduced
the number of cases it hears each year from roughly 150 to about half
49. See id. at 1704-11.
50. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 332 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(describing the "unique resources" of the Court and its "unique and valuable ability ... to
decide a case"); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he interpretation of the text of the Constitution in light of changed
circumstances and unforeseen events-and with full regard for the purposes underlying
the text-has always been the unique role of this Court."); Carmona v. Ward, 439 U.S.
1091, 1095 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to the Court's "constitutional
function to draw a meaning ... consonant with 'the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society' " (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion)); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 68 (1962) [hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH] (arguing that the "constitutional function" of the Supreme Court
is to "define values and proclaim principles").
51. See Hartnett, supra note 47, at 1699 (quoting letter from Chief Justice Taft to
Senator Copeland).
52. See Sup. Cr. R. 10 (stating that the Supreme Court will only grant certiorari for
"compelling reasons," such as to resolve a conflict among state courts or lower federal
courts on "important" federal questions, and will "rarely" grant certiorari "when the
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly
stated rule of law").
53. See Hartnett, supra note 47, at 1718-19, 1733; Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the
Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 728-29 (2001).
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that number.54 At the same time, the Court has managed its docket
with ever more care and precision, moving methodically through one
area of the law after another. Consider the Court's Commerce
Clause cases. Starting in 1992, the Court systematically reversed fifty
years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a series of decisions
beginning with New York v. United States55 and culminating recently
in United States v. Morrison.56 The Court has brought a similar focus
to the issue of state sovereign immunity, deciding seven cases in a
period of eight years concerning the states' immunity from federal
lawsuits." In the criminal context, the Court has recently decided a
series of cases involving the sentencing authority of judges58 and has
now embarked on a reevaluation of capital punishment.59
One might suggest that the Court's tendency to hear cases in
groups or clusters6° is due to the fact that once the Court issues a
major opinion it feels obliged to resolve questions raised by that
opinion. But it seems just as likely that the Justices are following an
unstated agenda, concentrating on areas of law they believe are in
need of reform or clarity.6t It is no secret, for instance, that Chief
54. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 578 (2003); Remarks by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, Lecture at the Faculty of Law of the University of Guanajuato,
Mexico (Sept. 27, 2001), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_0 9 -2 7 -
01.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The reduction in the Court's
caseload may be due, in part, to the "virtual abolition of the Court's mandatory appellate
jurisdiction in 1988." See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 54. But it also appears,
in part, to have "resulted from deliberate choices by the Justices." See id.
55. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down provision of Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act that required states to either regulate pursuant to Congress's
direction or take title to, and possession of, low-level radioactive waste generated within
their borders).
56. 529 U.S. 598, 611, 617 (2000) (holding that Congress's power to regulate activities
that, in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce is limited to "economic"
activities).
57. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721 (2003); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
58. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct.
2531 (2004); Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625
(2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
59. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 782 (2002); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
60. This tendency was first pointed out to me by Eric Shumsky.
61. See Smith, supra note 53, at 759, 768-69 (examining the determinants of the
Court's agenda setting and noting that the Court may also be acting to correct ideological
differences).
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Justice Rehnquist had long aimed to impose federalism-based limits
on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.62 Nor has Justice
Scalia concealed his opposition to the United States Sentencing
Commission,63 which issues the federal sentencing guidelines called
into question by his recent opinion in Blakely v. Washington.'
The Court also carefully chooses when to interject itself into
highly contentious debates. When the Fifth Circuit ruled in
Hopwood v. State of Texas 5 that diversity was not a compelling
justification for affirmative action in higher education, the Court
declined to review the issue for eight years before reversing the ruling
in Grutter v. University of Michigan.66 Was the Court's delay due to a
lack of petitions presenting the issue? Not likely. The state of Texas
twice asked the Court to review the Fifth Circuit's decision,67 and a
Ninth Circuit decision conflicting with Hopwood was the subject of
another petition for certiorari in 2001. 6 But the Justices waited until
they were ready to enter the debate and were presented with a case
they wanted to decide.
My point is not to criticize the Court's discretion over its docket
or the way it exercises that discretion.69 My point is simply that the
62. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell
out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command
the support of a majority of this Court."); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 309-10 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (insisting that in spite of the
Court's deference to Congress, "there are constitutional limits" to the commerce power,
and asserting that "[slome activities may be so private or local in nature that they simply
may not be in commerce"); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 837-40 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J.) (holding that Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate the wages and hours of state employees).
63. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The Court subsequently ruled that the sentencing
guidelines could not be treated as mandatory by federal judges. See United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 743 (2005).
65. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
66. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
67. Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929 (2001);
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
Although the Court does not usually explain denials of certiorari, Justice Ginsburg stated
in an opinion accompanying the first denial of certiorari that she voted not to hear the case
because the admissions policy found unconstitutional by the district court "has long since
been discontinued and will not be reinstated." Hopwood, 518 U.S. at 1033. She added
that the Supreme Court" 'reviews judgments, not opinions.' Accordingly, we must await
a final judgment on a program genuinely in controversy before addressing the important
question raised in this petition." Id.
68. Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
1051 (2001).
69. Others have already offered forceful critiques. See Hartnett, supra note 47, at
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existence of that discretion has gradually changed the Court's
conception of itself and of its role. The Court no longer views itself as
an ordinary court deciding ordinary disputes. Instead, it views itself
as a special institution with a unique capability to resolve our deepest
constitutional disagreements. We should not be surprised, therefore,
that the Court is sometimes unwilling to put off resolution of those
disagreements for another day.
2. Decline of the Political Question Doctrine
Another sign of the trend toward judicial supremacy can be seen
in the Court's treatment of the political question doctrine. Rooted in
the text and structure of the Constitution,7 ° the political question
doctrine recognizes that some legal questions are so intertwined with
policy considerations and so unamenable to judicial scrutiny that their
resolution must be left to the political branches. The doctrine is as
old as the federal judiciary itself and is one of the principal means of
limiting the Court's interference with the other branches. ' As Justice
Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison, "[q]uestions, in their nature
political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the
executive, can never be made in this court. 72
In recent decades, however, the Court has substantially
weakened the political question doctrine.73 Only twice in the past
forty years have a majority of the Justices held that a case presented a
nonjusticiable political question.74  And in both cases, the
1704-30.
70. Textual support for the political question doctrine is found in a handful of
constitutional provisions that vest the other branches of government with sole discretion
over certain matters. For instance, the Court has held that Article I, section 3, clause 6,
which states that "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments,"
precludes the judiciary from reviewing the Senate's decision about what constitutes a trial.
See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-38 (1993). The doctrine is also supported by
the separation of powers inherent in the Constitution's structure. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("[I]t is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the
States, which gives rise to the 'political question' "); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
393, 497-99 (1996) ("This 'political question doctrine' has always been based on
'separation of powers,' but those two concepts mean far different things to the modern
Court than they did to the Framers.").
71. See Barkow, supra note 46, at 331 ("The classical political question doctrine
reflects the constitutional structure of deference, for it is rooted in the language, structure,
and history of the Constitution itself."); Bickel, supra note 9, at 43.
72. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
73. See Barkow, supra note 46, at 263-73; David J. Bederman, Deference or
Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (1999).
74. See Barkow, supra note 46, at 267-68. The two cases are Nixon v. United States,
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Constitution clearly committed the issue at hand to the judgment of
Congress, leaving the Court little room to maneuver.75 In other cases
where it has been less clear whether the Constitution committed
resolution of the question to the political branches, the Court has
rejected application of the political question doctrine,76 often with
little discussion.77 The Court has also paid little attention to the
prudential considerations that once informed the doctrine,78 leading
506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) (refusing to review the impeachment trial of a federal judge
because the Senate has sole authority to craft impeachment procedures under Article I,
section 3, clause 6) and Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973) (denying a request to
regulate the activities of the Ohio National Guard because the Constitution vests in
Congress the "responsibility for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia"). In the
recent case of Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) (plurality opinion), four Justices
held that claims of partisan gerrymandering present nonjusticiable political questions. Id.
at 1778. But Justice Kennedy, who joined the plurality in the judgment, declined to
foreclose the possibility of judicial relief in all future partisan gerrymandering cases. See
id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Likewise, in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979), a plurality of the Court agreed that the issue of the President's power to terminate
a treaty without consulting the Senate was a nonjusticiable political question. But there
was no majority for this view, and the case was dismissed on the merits. See id. at 996-
1006.
It is unclear how many cases were dismissed under the political question doctrine
prior to this forty-year period. But it seems clear that the doctrine was invoked more
frequently than in recent decades. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Baker v. Carr: A
Commemorative Symposium: Panel I: Justiciability and the Political Thicket: Judicial
Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist "Rebuttable
Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1168-71 (2002) (noting that prior to Baker
v. Carr in 1962 the Court applied the political question doctrine to bar numerous
constitutional claims).
75. See Barkow, supra note 46, at 268 (arguing that the two cases in which the Court
found a political question "both involved strong textual anchors for finding that the
constitutional decision rested with the political branches").
76. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27 (1986) (finding no political question
in challenge to Indiana's apportionment plan); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-
22, 527-28 (1969) (rejecting claim that constitutional provision making each House "the
Judge of the ... Qualifications of its own Members" renders nonjusticiable a claim by a
congressman that he was improperly excluded from the House of Representatives).
77. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 248-50 (1985)
(rejecting claim that Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs renders Indian tribes'
dispute with New York counties nonjusticiable); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-43
(1983) (rejecting claim that challenge to legislative veto presented nonjusticiable political
question); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1976) (rejecting application of political
question doctrine to claims by county employees that they were fired by sheriff's office
because of political views); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28 (1968) (finding no political
question in suit challenging validity of Ohio election laws).
78. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (holding that plaintiff's claim
presented a political question, but limiting the role of prudential considerations); Powell,
395 U.S. at 550 (rejecting application of the political question doctrine without discussing
prudential factors). But see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1778-92 (2004) (plurality
opinion) (relying on the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards to
conclude that claims of partisan gerrymandering present political questions).
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several commentators to conclude that the prudential aspect of the
doctrine, if not the entire doctrine, is no longer viable. 9
One might suggest that the demise of the political question
doctrine is due primarily to the lack of cases presenting true political
questions, not to a "juricentric ' '8' bias on the part of the Justices.81
But given the Court's intervention in the 2000 presidential election
dispute, this seems doubtful. In a recently published article, Rachel
Barkow makes a strong case that the Article II question at the heart
of Bush v. Gore 2 (and upon which three Justices based their
decisions in Bush v. Gore 1/3) presented a nonjusticiable political
question.84  Relying upon the text of Article I, original
understanding, and subsequent constitutional history, Barkow argues
that Congress is responsible for determining whether the slate of
electors submitted by a state has been selected in the manner chosen
by the state legislature and that the Court therefore should have
refrained from hearing the case." Barkow's conclusions are
debatable, and even she does not claim that the argument for
deferring to Congress was a slam-dunk. But what is striking, as
79. See Barkow, supra note 46, at 267 (arguing that Baker v. Carr signaled the
"beginning of the end of the prudential political question doctrine"); Bederman, supra
note 73, at 1441 (arguing that the political question doctrine "is largely out of favor today
in the Supreme Court, even with respect to foreign affairs controversies"); Jack L.
Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1395, 1427-28 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986), marked a shift away from the
prudential political question doctrine); Nat Stern, The Political Question Doctrine in State
Courts, 35 S.C. L. REV. 405, 406 (1984) ("[Tlhe political question doctrine appears to have
nearly fallen into desuetude ....").
80. The term comes from Robert Post and Reva Siegel. See Robert C. Post & Reva
B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section
Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003).
81. Some scholars also have argued that the function once served by the political
question doctrine is now being served by standing doctrine. See Linda Sandstrom Simard,
Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the Political Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303,
306, 333 (1996) (arguing that the standing and political question doctrines both center on
separation of powers, making the latter unnecessary); Mark Tushnet, Baker v. Carr: A
Commemorative Symposium: Panel L Justiciability and the Political Thicket: Law and
Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the
Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1204-05 (2002) (arguing that the
prudential limitation under the political question doctrine has been transferred to standing
doctrine); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1509-10 (1988) (noting that while standing may have
replaced the political question doctrine, it may not adequately serve the same purpose).
82. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
83. 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
84. See Barkow, supra note 46, at 273-77.
85. See id. at 277-78.
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Barkow points out, is that the Court did not even consider doing SO.8 6
The political question doctrine is primarily concerned with the
judiciary's power to decide constitutional questions vis-A-vis the
political branches, whereas the principle of avoidance concerns the
wisdom of deciding constitutional questions later rather than sooner.
But the two doctrines are nonetheless related. Both reflect a degree
of humility about the Court's competence and a measure of awe for
the task of constitutional interpretation. In addition, although the
avoidance principle divides power between courts now and in the
future-instead of between the courts and the political branches-it
provides time for the political branches to reach their own
conclusions on constitutional questions. Thus, the demise of the
political question doctrine is another indicator that the rise of
unnecessary constitutional questions is part of a larger, more
comprehensive trend.
3. Weakening of the Mootness Doctrine
A third area in which the Court has embraced a more expansive
approach to its jurisdiction is the doctrine of mootness. Although
many critics have complained that the Court's conception of standing
is too rigid,87 its view of mootness has become decidedly flexible.88
Particularly in the class action context, the Court has been reluctant
to declare cases moot once the wheels of multi-party litigation have
been set in motion. In Sosna v. Iowa,89 for instance, the plaintiff filed
a class action suit challenging an Iowa law that prohibited residents
86. See id. at 275-76.
87. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury
Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2002) (arguing that the standing doctrine harms the less
privileged); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 1915 (1986) (stating that the Court's private right approach to standing contradicts
the history and understanding of Article III); William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing,
98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988) (arguing that standing should be a "question on the merits of
plaintiff's claim" rather than a preliminary jurisdictional formula); Sunstein, supra note 6
(arguing that the "injury in fact" standing requirement is a misinterpretation of the
Constitution); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1432 (1988) (arguing that the Court's injury analysis for standing purposes leads
to inconsistent results and little guidance for lower courts); Mark V. Tushnet, The New
Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977) (arguing that
decisions on questions of standing are concealed decisions on the merits of the underlying
constitutional claim).
88. See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400 (1980) (noting
"the flexible character of the Art. III mootness doctrine"); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 67 (14th ed. 2001) ("[T]he Court has
recurrently relaxed the mootness barrier and found a number of exceptions to it .....
89. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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from obtaining a divorce in an Iowa court until they had lived in the
state for one year. The district court ruled in favor of the state, and
while the case was pending on appeal, the plaintiff fulfilled the one-
year residency requirement and obtained a divorce.90 But the Court
declined to dismiss the case as moot. As long as the class
representative had standing when the suit was brought and there were
members of a properly certified class whose claims were still live, the
Court held, the case remained live.9 The Court extended this ruling
in United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,92 holding that a
plaintiff who files a class action suit may even appeal the denial of
class certification after the plaintiff's own claims have become moot.93
The Court has also dispensed with the requirement of a live
dispute in cases involving an issue that is capable of repetition yet
evading review. Although the Court first articulated this exception to
the mootness doctrine in 1911,94 it was rarely invoked until the late
1960s, since which time it has been cited frequently by the Court.95
Moreover, the exception has at times threatened to swallow the rule.
In the Court's formal definition, a case is moot unless there is "a
reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same
controversy will recur involving the same complaining party."96 Yet
in several cases, the Court has applied the exception without any
evidence that the same plaintiff would be subjected to the same
action again.97 Chief Justice Rehnquist has urged the Court to go
90. See id. at 397-98.
91. See id. at 401; see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 752-57 (1976)
(allowing plaintiff to continue to represent class in discrimination suit even after it became
clear that plaintiff did not have a valid discrimination claim of his own); Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 110-11 n.11 (1975) (finding class action suit challenging pretrial detention
practices not moot even though named plaintiff was no longer in pretrial detention).
92. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
93. See id. at 404; see also Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 340
(1980) (allowing plaintiffs to appeal denial of class certification even after settling claims
with defendant).
94. See S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515
(1911).
95. According to a Westlaw search of "capable of repetition yet evading review"
conducted on August 10, 2004, the Court did not cite the exception from 1911 until 1968 in
Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 179 (1968). Since
Carroll, it has cited the exception in sixty-four cases. It is possible that the Court has
relied on the doctrine in fewer cases since it may have cited the doctrine in some cases
without applying it. The Court may also have applied the doctrine in some cases without
using the term "capable of repetition yet evading review."
96. See, e.g., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (emphasis added) (internal
quotations omitted); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam).
97. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317-23 (1988) (holding case not moot despite
absence of evidence that disabled student would: (a) seek benefits under federal law; (b)
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even further, suggesting an exception for cases that become moot
after the Court grants certiorari or notes probable jurisdiction. Citing
the "unique and valuable ability of this Court to decide a case" and
the "unique resources... [that] are squandered in every case in which
it becomes apparent after the decisional process is underway that we
may not reach the question presented," Rehnquist argues that the
Court should "abandon the doctrine of mootness altogether in cases
which this Court has decided to review .... ,98
As with my discussion of the Court's certiorari discretion, the
point here is not to criticize the Court's approach. To the contrary,
the mootness exceptions carved out by the Court seem sensible in
light of the difficulties presented by multi-party litigation and the
fleeting nature of some injuries. 99 But the weakening of the mootness
doctrine highlights a willingness by the Court to relax constraints on
its jurisdiction in the interest of resolving larger disputes and
answering important legal questions. And in that regard, it provides
important context for the rise of unnecessary constitutional rulings.
4. Diminished Deference to Congress
The final way in which the Court has asserted its supremacy is in
the diminished deference it has shown to congressional exercises of
power. For more than fifty years after the New Deal, the Court gave
Congress nearly unlimited latitude to define the scope of its power
under the Commerce Clause."°° As long as Congress had a rational
basis for concluding that a regulated activity affected interstate
commerce, the Court made clear that it would respect that judgment
and not impose its own view of the matter. 0 1 In the past decade,
engage in same misconduct that subjected him to unilateral change of placement; and (c)
be unilaterally moved by different school district than the one that precipitated suit); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (finding case not moot because plaintiff could become
pregnant again and might wish to exercise her right to an abortion); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972) (accepting jurisdiction over plaintiff's challenge to voting
law's one-year residency requirement even though plaintiff was eligible to vote by the time
the case reached the Supreme Court).
98. Honig, 484 U.S. at 332 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
99. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, § 2.5.5, at 142-43.
100. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power "To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
101. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-83
(1981) (upholding Surface Mining Act); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-57
(1971) (holding Congress has power to control local loan sharking under the Commerce
Clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-302 (1964) (upholding Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as applied to restaurants); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 252-62 (1964) (upholding Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a hotel).
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however, the Court has reformulated its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, holding that Congress may regulate only commercial
or economic activities that have a substantial affect on interstate
commerce.1" The Court also has made clear that it will no longer
defer to Congress's judgment that a particular activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, but will instead scrutinize the evidence
supporting that judgment on its own. °3
An even more striking example of the Court's diminished
deference to Congress can be seen in cases involving Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress "power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."'" Because
Section 5 gives Congress enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment, scholars and judges have long argued that Congress has
a special role to play in defining the Amendment's substantive
protections. 105  And for a time, at least, the Court agreed. In
Katzenbach v. Morgan,"0 6 the Court held that it would not second-
guess congressional judgments about the appropriateness of
legislation under Section 5.107 "It is not for us to review the
102. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) ("Lopez's review of
Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained
federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on
interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.");
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) ("Where economi ,activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.").
Congress may also regulate the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See
id. at 558.
103. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-19. In Morrison, the record showed that Congress
held four years of hearings on the relationship between violence against women and
interstate commerce. Those hearings included testimony from physicians, law professors,
survivors of rape and domestic violence, representatives of state law enforcement and
private business, and reports on gender bias from task forces in twenty-one states. This
"mountain of data," as Justice Souter described it, resulted in eight separate reports issued
by Congress and far outweighed the evidence compiled by Congress in passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 628-31, 635. (Souter, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the Court
rejected the findings because they were based "on a method of reasoning that we have
already rejected as unworkable if we are to maintain the Constitution's enumeration of
powers." See id. at 615.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
105. See Kimberly E. Dean, In Light of the Evil Presented: What Kind of Prophylactic
Anti-Discrimination Legislation Can Congress Enact After Garrett?, 43 B.C. L. REV. 697,
702 (2002) (arguing that the "Amendment's drafters.., gave Congress, not the Court, the
primary role in securing the Amendment's protections"); Earl Warren, Fourteenth
Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 212, 216
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970). Former Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote: "[Section 5] was
a rather clear mandate to Congress to undertake the task of defining and securing the
rights guaranteed ... by the amendment." Id.
106. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
107. Id. at 649-58.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
congressional resolution of these factors," the Court stated.0 ' "It is
enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress
might resolve the conflict as it did." 1°9 But the Rehnquist Court has
held that Congress has no more interpretive authority in this context
than in cases involving the Commerce Clause. In City of Boerne v.
Flores,110 the Court struck down an attempt by Congress to provide
greater protection under the Free Exercise Clause than the Court
itself had provided in an earlier case."1 According to the Court,
Section 5 only gives Congress "the power 'to enforce' " the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, "not the power
to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."
112
The Court has expanded on Boerne in cases involving
congressional attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity under
Section 5. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank,"3 the Court held that Congress
exceeded its power under Section 5 when it authorized plaintiffs to
sue states in federal court for patent infringement.'14 The Court
relied heavily on the lack of evidence in the legislative record that
patent infringements by the states violated the Fourteenth
Amendment or had "become a problem of national import." '115 But
even where Congress has offered substantial evidence to support its
actions, the Court has shown little deference. In Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court held that Congress did
not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Americans
with Disabilities Act despite a legislative record that included
evidence of "massive, society-wide discrimination" against the
disabled. 6 That record was the result of hearings in every state
attended by more than 30,000 people, as well as census data, national
108. Id. at 653.
109. Id.
110. 521 U.s. 507 (1997).
111. Id. at 512. The earlier case was Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), which held that generally applicable laws that incidentally burden the free exercise
of religion are not subject to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 883-86. Boerne involved the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prohibited the government from substantially
burdening the free exercise of religion unless the burden was narrowly tailored to further a
compelling governmental interest. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16.
112. 521 U.S. at 519.
113. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
114. Id. at 630.
115. Id. at 641 ("The Senate Report ... contains no evidence that unremedied patent
infringement by States had become a problem of national import.").
116. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting testimony of Justin Dart, chairperson of the Task Force on the Rights
and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, S. REP. No. 101-116, at 8-9 (1989)).
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polls, and other studies. 1 7  According to the Court, however, the
record was inadequate because it did not suggest a clear pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination on the part of the states that was
significant enough to justify an abrogation of state sovereign
immunity."8
What does the Court's diminished deference to Congress have to
do with the rise of unnecessary constitutional rulings? Like the
political question doctrine, the concept of deference is based on a
belief that judicial review should be exercised cautiously and that the
other branches of government have a role to play in constitutional
interpretation.'1 9 Deference derives from an acknowledgement that
the Court may not have all the answers and therefore should not
decide all the questions. This same acknowledgment underlies the
principle that courts should not decide every constitutional question
that comes before them, but should resolve only those necessary to
the outcome of a case or controversy. To abandon deference,
therefore, is to reject the very premise of the avoidance principle. To
put it another way, a court that is unwilling to share interpretive
authority with Congress is unlikely to share interpretive authority
with later courts by deferring some questions for another day.
In sum, the rise of unnecessary constitutional rulings is not an
isolated development. In its shift to a discretionary docket, its
weakening of the political question and mootness doctrines, and in its
diminished deference to congressional judgments, the Court has
embraced an expansive role for the federal judiciary in which
unnecessary constitutional rulings are merely par for the course.
B. Doctrinal Explanations
The trend toward judicial supremacy is only part of the
117. See id. at 377-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 357 ("[E]ven if it were to be determined that each incident [in the
record] upon fuller examination showed unconstitutional action on the part of the States,
these incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination on which [section] 5 legislation must be based."). The
Court also rejected Congress's effort to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5
in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000). Although the Court has
upheld attempts at abrogation in two recent cases, see Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978,
1983-84 (2004); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003), the trend is
still toward limiting congressional power under Section 5.
119. See Barkow, supra note 46, at 319-23 (arguing that there exists "a spectrum of
deference that recognizes that the Constitution delegates authority to the political
branches to different degrees, and that some of those delegations permit the political
branches to give substantive meaning to the constitutional provisions in the exercise of
their discretion").
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explanation, though. The rise of unnecessary constitutional rulings is
also the result of considerations specific to each of the doctrinal areas
in which the Court has authorized such rulings. In this Section, I
describe the evolution of these doctrines and explain how the Court
has departed from the principle of constitutional avoidance in each. I
also argue that although there are differences in the evolution of
these doctrines, there is one theme common to all. In each area in
which the Court has authorized unnecessary constitutional rulings,
earlier developments limited the opportunities for federal courts to
engage in constitutional interpretation. It is unclear the extent to
which this has motivated the Court, and I am hesitant to speculate too
much about the unstated reasons behind Court decisions. But given
the trend toward judicial supremacy, it is plausible to view the Court's
embrace of unnecessary constitutional rulings, at least in part, as an
effort to preserve opportunities for federal court interpretation of the
Constitution.
1. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of official immunity has its roots in the common
law, which provided absolute immunity for legislators and judges and
limited, or qualified, immunity for many executive officials. 120 The
doctrine was initially a defense only to common law torts such as false
arrest and malicious prosecution. In 1951, however, the Supreme
Court held that legislators could invoke absolute immunity as a
defense to constitutional torts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.121 The decision
had limited significance at the time; in the first eighty years after
passage of the Civil Rights Acts, only a few lawsuits were brought
under § 1983.122 But when the Court expanded the scope of § 1983 in
Monroe v. Pape,23 interpreting the words "under color of state law"
to include unauthorized conduct by public officials,124 the decision
took on new importance.12 Facing a wave of lawsuits under § 1983,
120. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) ("Few doctrines were more solidly
established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts
committed within their judicial jurisdiction .... "); id. at 555 (discussing the limited
immunity of police officers under the common law); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
379 (1951) (Black, J., concurring) (referring to the "long-standing and wise tradition that
legislators are immune from legal responsibility for their intra-legislative statements and
activities").
121. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
122. See PETER W. Low & JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS:
SECTION 1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 11-12 (2d ed. 1994).
123. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
124. Id. at 183-87.
125. The upshot of Monroe v. Pape was that an officer who acted outside the scope of
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public officials turned to immunity as a way to avoid liability. And
the Court obliged.
In the 1967 case of Pierson v. Ray,12 6 the Court held that judges
are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for acts committed
within their judicial jurisdiction. 127  The Court later extended this
holding to cover prosecutors and the President.28 Also in Pierson,
the Court held that although police officers do not have absolute
immunity, they do enjoy qualified immunity under § 1983 for arrests
made in good faith and with probable cause. 129 "[I]f the jury found
that the officers reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest was
constitutional," the Court wrote, "then a verdict for the officers
would follow even though the arrest was in fact unconstitutional.'
13°
As articulated in Pierson and subsequent cases, the qualified
immunity standard included both a subjective and objective test.'
The subjective test was whether the official acted in good faith or with
"the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights
or other injury. 132 The objective test was whether the official
violated "clearly established constitutional rights" of which he
"reasonably should have known.' 13' If the official failed either the
subjective or objective test, he was not immune from liability."
Because the subjective test depended upon evidence about the
official's state of mind, the issue of qualified immunity usually was not
resolved until after the official had testified at trial, or at least in a
his duties or who departed from state law could be sued under § 1983. Had the dissent
prevailed in Monroe, § 1983 would have applied only to officers who violated federal
rights while acting within the bounds of state law. Officers who violated federal rights
while departing from state law would have been subject to suit only under state law.
126. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
127. Id. at 554.
128. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (holding that the president has
absolute immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (holding that
prosecutors have absolute immunity).
129. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557.
130. Id.
131. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) ("[T]he appropriate standard
necessarily contains elements of both [an objective and subjective test].").
132. Id. at 322; see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) ("It is the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity
of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.").
133. See Wood, 420 U.S. at 322.
134. See id. (holding that a school board member "is not immune from liability.., if he
knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights").
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deposition.'35 This had two consequences. First, it meant that before
courts decided the issue of qualified immunity, they frequently were
required to decide the underlying constitutional question on a motion
to dismiss. For example, a defendant might argue that the plaintiff
failed to state a claim because, even if all the allegations in the
complaint were true, the constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff
did not exist.136 Second, the subjective test meant that even if a
defendant ultimately was granted qualified immunity, he would still
have to spend time and money defending the suit at least until the
end of discovery.
The Court confronted this second consequence in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.137 There, the Court eliminated the subjective aspect of the
doctrine so that qualified immunity could be granted earlier in the
litigation. 3 8 The new standard, the Court held, was purely objective:
whether the officer violated "clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.' 1 39  As the Court later explained, the Harlow decision
"completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at
all embodied in the common law." 140
Harlow also had implications for the first consequence. Because
qualified immunity now turned solely on whether the right was
"clearly established," and because this is a legal question that can be
answered on the pleadings alone, Harlow implied that in cases in
which the defendant had qualified immunity, courts would no longer
have to decide the underlying constitutional issue; they could simply
rule that the right was not clearly established. The opinion in Harlow
was ambiguous on this point, however. "On summary judgment," the
Court stated, "the judge appropriately may determine, not only the
currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established
at the time an action occurred. '141
The Court's effort to strengthen qualified immunity continued
135. See, e.g., DeVasto v. Faherty, 658 F.2d 859, 865-66 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that
issue of good faith can only be decided on basis of official's trial or deposition testimony).
136. See, e.g., Evans v. Dillahunty, 662 F.2d 522, 527 (8th Cir. 1981) (reversing district
court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action); Harris v.
City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1136 (9th Cir. 1981) (reversing district court's decision on
constitutional issue, but affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant on qualified
immunity grounds); Street v. Cherba, 662 F.2d 1037, 1040 (4th Cir. 1981) (reaching the
constitutional issue, but holding that defendants had qualified immunity).
137. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
138. Id. at 818.
139. Id.
140. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,645 (1987).
141. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
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three years later in Mitchell v. Forsythe.42  The issue there was
whether a district court's denial of qualified immunity could be
immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine.143 The
defendants argued that if they could not immediately appeal the
denial, one of the primary benefits of qualified immunity-the
avoidance of litigation altogether-would be lost.1" The Court
agreed, holding that qualified immunity is "immunity from suit rather
than a mere defense to liability.
145
In reaching this decision, the Court appeared to back away from
its suggestion in Harlow that courts could decide not only whether the
right asserted by the plaintiff was clearly established but also whether
the right existed at all. One factor in determining whether a lower
court decision can be immediately appealed is whether the decision
involves a "claim of right separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action."' 14 Applying this factor to qualified immunity,
the Court concluded that a "claim of immunity is conceptually distinct
from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been
violated."'47 Why? Because an "appellate court reviewing the denial
of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the
correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even determine
whether the plaintiffs allegations actually state a claim."'" Rather, all
the court need determine is "whether the legal norms allegedly
violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the
challenged actions.' '1 49
Combined, Mitchell and Harlow significantly curtailed the extent
to which lower courts would decide constitutional questions in
qualified immunity cases. Whereas lower courts had once frequently
been required to decide the underlying constitutional question before
142. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
143. Id. at 518-19.
144. Id. at 526.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 527 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949)).
147. Id. at 527-28.
148. Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
149. Id. Not all the justices agreed with this assertion. In dissent, Justice Brennan
argued that although the qualified immunity question is not identical to the underlying
constitutional question in a case, "the two are quite closely related." Id. at 545 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Moreover, Brennan argued, "a trial court seeking to answer either
question would refer to the same or similar cases and statutes, would consult the same
treatises and secondary materials, and would undertake a rather similar course of
reasoning." Id. Brennan is correct to a certain extent. But as I will argue in Part II.C.1,
the analysis of the qualified immunity question is much more limited than the analysis of
the underlying constitutional question.
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resolving a claim of qualified immunity, they could now resolve the
qualified immunity claim much earlier in the case. In addition,
although the Supreme Court had technically left lower courts free to
decide the constitutional question at the same time they resolved the
qualified immunity claim, it had strongly signaled that doing so was
unnecessary. Because the two questions are "conceptually distinct,"
the Court had stated, a lower court could skip the constitutional issue
and go straight to qualified immunity. 5 '
In light of this signal, it is not surprising that many courts did just
that. In the decade following Mitchell, the vast majority of circuit
courts bypassed the underlying constitutional question and proceeded
directly to the issue of qualified immunity.'' In doing so, many cited
Mitchell's statement that a court reviewing a qualified immunity claim
need not "determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state
a claim."'52
One might have thought the Supreme Court would be gratified
by this development. Lower courts were following its mandate to
resolve qualified immunity claims as soon as possible. They were also
exercising admirable restraint by declining to decide constitutional
questions unnecessarily. But apparently the Court was not pleased,
for beginning in 1991 it sent a different message to lower courts. In
Siegert v. Gilley, 5' the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his
complaint on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that the lower
court had incorrectly applied a heightened pleading standard.154 The
Supreme Court did not address this issue, however. Instead, it ruled
that the plaintiff's claim should have been dismissed because "[h]is
allegations, even if accepted as true, did not state a claim for violation
of any rights secured to him under the United States Constitution.' 1 55
As was common at the time, the lower court had skipped this
question. But according to Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
150. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527-28.
151.- See Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir. 1990); Pachaly v. City of
Lynchburg, 897 F.2d 723, 727 (4th Cir. 1990); Geter v. Fortenberry, 882 F.2d 167, 169 (5th
Cir. 1989); Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1989); Runge v. Dove, 857 F.2d
469, 471 (8th Cir. 1988); Wrigley v. Greanias, 842 F.2d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 1988); Cheveras
Pacheco v. Rivera Gonzalez, 809 F.2d 125, 127 (1st Cir. 1987); Hynson v. City of Chester,
827 F.2d 932, 934 (3rd Cir. 1987); Huron Valley Hosp. v. City of Pontiac, 792 F.2d 563, 568
(6th Cir. 1986). According to one count, appellate courts bypassed the constitutional issue
in about sixty-five percent of qualified immunity cases. See Greabe, supra note 36, at 410
n.35.
152. See, e.g., Pachaly, 897 F.2d at 727; Hynson, 827 F.2d at 934.
153. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
154. Id. at 227.
155. Id.
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opinion, that was a mistake: "[Tihe Court of Appeals should not
have assumed, without deciding, this preliminary issue in this case." 156
As support for this ruling, Rehnquist quoted Harlow's statement
that a judge considering a qualified immunity claim "appropriately
may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether
that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred.
1 57
This statement, of course, suggested only that lower courts were
permitted to decide the underlying constitutional question, not that
they were required to. So Rehnquist offered an alternative argument:
A necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the
constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is "clearly
established" at the time the defendant acted is the
determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation
of a constitutional right at all. Decision of this purely legal
question permits courts expeditiously to weed out suits which
fail the test without requiring a defendant who rightly claims
qualified immunity to engage in expensive and time consuming
preparation to defend the suit on its merits. 58
Rehnquist's argument is flawed in two respects. First, deciding
whether the plaintiff has asserted the violation of a constitutional
right is not a necessary concomitant to deciding whether the right
asserted by the plaintiff is clearly established. As I explain more fully
in Part II.C.1, these two inquiries overlap somewhat, but are not
identical. Deciding whether a right was clearly established at a given
time involves only an analysis of precedent as of that date, while
deciding whether a right exists at all involves other considerations-
such as whether the right is supported by constitutional text,
structure, history, or analogies to other rights. The upshot is that
although a right cannot be clearly established unless it exists, it can
exist without being clearly established. It is possible that even though
no court has ever articulated the right, a full constitutional analysis
would reveal its existence. Thus, deciding whether the right exists is
in no way "a necessary concomitant" to deciding whether the right is
clearly established. The latter determination can be made entirely
independent of the former.
The second flaw in Rehnquist's argument is his claim that
deciding whether the right exists at all "permits courts expeditiously
156. Id. at 232.
157. Id. at 231 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
158. Id. at 232.
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to weed out suits" without requiring a defendant to engage in
needless litigation. It is true that Harlow's elimination of the
subjective component of qualified immunity made it easier for courts
to dismiss cases early in litigation. Defendants also benefited from
Mitchell's holding that a denial of qualified immunity is immediately
appealable. But the Court's instruction that lower courts should
decide the underlying constitutional question at the same time they
decide the qualified immunity question does not speed up litigation.
Both questions are purely legal and can be answered on the basis of
the pleadings alone. Moreover, answering the former question does
not provide any additional benefit to defendants. If the court grants
qualified immunity, the defendant is unaffected by a decision that the
right does not exist. And if the court denies qualified immunity, it has
decided that the right is clearly established, which necessarily means
that the right exists. Either way, a separate decision on whether the
right exists makes no difference to the defendant.
If Rehnquist's argument does not provide a plausible explanation
for the decision in Siegert, what does? In subsequent cases, other
members of the Court have suggested that deciding whether the right
exists helps to settle rules of conduct and to establish rights that can
later be the basis for suits under § 1983.19 But the Court did not
mention either of these rationales in Siegert, and in light of
Rehnquist's general reluctance to recognize new constitutional
rights,"6 it seems unlikely that he was motivated by the latter
consideration. In fact, given the outcome in Siegert, one might argue
159. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. Writing for the majority in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, Justice Souter explained:
[I]f the policy of avoidance were always followed in favor of ruling on qualified
immunity whenever there was no clearly settled constitutional rule of primary
conduct, standards of official conduct would tend to remain uncertain, to the
detriment both of officials and individuals. An immunity determination, with
nothing more, provides no clear standard, constitutional or nonconstitutional.
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998).
160. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586-605 (2003) (joining Justice Scalia's
dissent from majority opinion striking down prohibition on same-sex sodomy); DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989) (writing for the Court,
holding that state's failure to protect a child against parental abuse does not violate the
due process clause); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1997) (writing for
the Court, holding that asserted right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the due process clause); John Denvir, Justice Brennan, Justice
Rehnquist, and Free Speech, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 285, 293-99 (1985); John Denvir, Justice
Rehnquist and Constitutional Interpretation, 34 HASTINGS. L.J. 1011, 1021-25 (1983);
Larry Reibstein, Whose Right Is It?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20, 1997, at 36 ("[T]he Rehnquist
Court has never been eager to create new constitutional rights .... ).
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that Rehnquist reached out to decide the constitutional issue for
precisely the opposite reason: to deny the existence of the right
before it could take root. Some of the language in his opinion
supports this view. In the passage quoted above, Rehnquist states
that the underlying constitutional question should be decided so the
courts can "weed out" suits that fail to state a claim. Is it a stretch to
think that Rehnquist was motivated primarily by a desire to weed out
claims before they take root? For those familiar with his record, the
question answers itself."'
Even lower courts seemed to sense the illogic of Rehnquist's
opinion. In the years after Siegert, many continued to skip the
underlying constitutional question and proceed straight to the issue of
qualified immunity.' 62 Some explicitly rejected Siegert's instruction,
holding that courts should reach the constitutional issue only if: (1) it
is clear that the right does not exist; and (2) the plaintiff's inability to
sue for injunctive relief would prevent the issue from ever being
resolved (qualified immunity is only a defense to suits for money
damages).163 For the former conclusion, they found support from
Justice Stevens, who wrote in a concurring opinion in a subsequent
case that a court should reach the underlying constitutional issue only
if it could be easily resolved.1" But where the issue was complicated,
Stevens argued, courts should proceed straight to the qualified
161. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY
OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 320-26 (3d ed. 1992) (reviewing
Rehnquist's jurisprudence as associate justice). In Part III.B, I describe more fully how
the Court often reaches out to deny the existence of constitutional rights when doing so is
not necessary to resolve the case before it.
162. See, e.g., Powers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1308 (S.D. Ala. 2000)
("[T]he Court concludes that it is appropriate to ... address first whether the
constitutional and statutory rights asserted by the plaintiff were clearly established .... ");
Shepherd v. Sanchez, No. 96-9012, 2000 WL 1010829, *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that it
would "consider the qualified immunity question without reaching the underlying issue of
whether plaintiff has a constitutional right not to have his dreadlocks touched"); Does v.
Covington County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 554, 576 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (stating that
"determining whether the plaintiffs have first asserted a constitutional violation would be
a futile exercise. The defendants, in their official capacities, are without a doubt entitled
to qualified immunity .... "); Bapat v. Conn. Dep't of Health Servs., 815 F. Supp. 525, 535
(D. Conn. 1992) ("The threshold issue raised by the defendants' claim of qualified
immunity is whether the right alleged to have been violated was 'clearly established.' ").
163. See Mollica v. Volker, 229 F.3d 366, 373-74 (2d Cir. 2000); Home v. Coughlin, 178
F.3d 603, 605-06 (2d Cir. 1999), amended by Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 249 n.5
(1999); Santamorena v. Ga. Military Coll., 147 F.3d 1337, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 1998); Spivey
v. Elliott, 41 F.3d 1497, 1498-99 (11th Cir. 1995).
164. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 859 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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immunity question.165
The Supreme Court put an end to this uncertainty in the 2001
case of Saucier v. Katz.166 In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy
wrote that a court required to rule upon a qualified immunity claim
"must consider" as a threshold issue whether the plaintiff has asserted
the violation of a constitutional right. 67 Only if the answer is yes,
Kennedy stated, should the lower court proceed to the qualified
immunity question. In explaining this approach, Kennedy wrote:
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was
violated on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary
to set forth principles which will become the basis for a holding
that a right is clearly established. This is the process for the
law's elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our
insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a
constitutional right as the first inquiry. The law might be
deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead
to the question whether the law clearly established that the
officer's conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the
case.
168
Two things are worth noting about Kennedy's opinion. First,
when Chief Justice Rehnquist initially instructed lower courts to
decide the underlying constitutional issue in Siegert, Kennedy had
objected. "I do not ... agree that the Court of Appeals 'should not
have assumed, without deciding,' this issue," he wrote in a
concurrence.169 "[I]t seems to reverse the usual ordering of issues to
tell the trial and appellate courts that they should resolve the
constitutional question first."'7 °  Kennedy also noted that the
constitutional issue in Siegert was "itself one of some difficulty,"
adding that "it is unwise to resolve the point without the benefit of a
decision by the Court of Appeals and full briefing and argument
here."171
Second, Kennedy argues in Saucier that unless a lower court
decides the constitutional issue in a case, "the law might be deprived
165. Id. ("When, however, the question is both difficult and unresolved, I believe it
wiser to adhere to the policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional
questions.").
166. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
167. See id. at 201.
168. Id.
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of this explanation. 17 2 This is true, but beside the point. Whenever
the Court avoids a constitutional question, the law is deprived of
further elaboration and explanation. That is the point of the
avoidance principle: to put off the elaboration of important
principles of law. Thus, Kennedy cannot mean that the avoidance
principle should be abandoned whenever its application would
deprive the law of further elaboration. So what does Kennedy mean
and why has the Court instructed lower courts to always decide the
underlying constitutional issue in qualified immunity cases?
One possibility is that the Justices recognize the inherent tension
between the qualified immunity doctrine and the avoidance principle.
Plaintiffs cannot overcome qualified immunity unless the right they
assert is clearly established. Yet if courts always avoid the underlying
constitutional issues in qualified immunity cases, they will have fewer
opportunities to establish clearly new constitutional rights.' This
Catch-22 has been highlighted by several scholars'74 and likely
explains why the more liberal members of the Court-and perhaps
even Kennedy-have embraced the SiegertlSaucier approach.175
But for the Court's more conservative members, this explanation
is simply not credible. They have never expressed concern that the
avoidance of constitutional issues in qualified immunity cases creates
a Catch-22 for civil rights plaintiffs. Nor are the Court's conservative
members particularly supportive of the creation of new constitutional
rights.'76 To the contrary, they generally object to the creation of new
constitutional rights as a form of judicial activism. So what explains
their support of the new approach?
One possible answer is suggested by the arc of the Court's
qualified immunity doctrine. Prior to Harlow and Mitchell, federal
courts frequently decided constitutional questions in § 1983 cases.
But after those two decisions, courts largely limited themselves to the
sub-constitutional question of whether the right was clearly
established. The conservatives on the Court undoubtedly support the
expansion of qualified immunity under Harlow and Mitchell. 77 But
172. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
173. I say "fewer opportunities" because courts would still be able to establish new
constitutional civil rights in criminal cases and in civil rights suits seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief.
174. See Greabe, supra note 36, at 405; Kamin, supra note 36, at 45-50.
175. Indeed, this is why liberal scholars have supported the Siegert/Saucier approach.
See discussion in Part III.B.
176. See supra note 160.
177. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for instance, has argued that absolute immunity should
be extended to high-ranking federal executive officials acting within the outer bounds of
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
given the Court's embrace of the norm declaration model, they may
be troubled by the extent to which those decisions have limited the
role of the federal judiciary. If so, their embrace of unnecessary
constitutional rulings may be, at least in part, an effort to remedy the
situation.
Admittedly, there is no direct evidence to support this theory.
Instead, it is an inference from the evolution of qualified immunity
and from the Court's broader march toward judicial supremacy. But
it is also consistent with developments in the other areas in which the
Court has authorized unnecessary constitutional rulings.
2. Habeas Corpus
The history of habeas corpus doctrine is closely tied to the
Court's evolving view of retroactivity. During the Warren era, the
Court initially held that new rules of constitutional criminal
procedure would only be applied in the cases in which they were
announced and would not automatically be applied retroactively.
178
This holding resulted from an unusual alliance of conservative and
liberal justices. Conservatives endorsed non-retroactivity as a way to
limit the impact of the Warren Court's "criminal procedure
revolution," while liberals supported it on the assumption that many
of the reforms they desired would be unpalatable if applied
retroactively.179
This alliance gradually broke down, and the Court articulated a
new approach to retroactivity. First, in Griffith v. Kentucky,18° it held
that new rules of criminal procedure would always apply retroactively
their authority. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 517-30 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that the lack of absolute immunity for executive officials will disrupt
government); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 822 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the denial of absolute immunity to executive officials in Butz v.
Economou should be re-examined).
178. Writing for the majority in Linkletter v. Walker, Justice Clark explained:
Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited
from applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and
demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
179. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 8, at 1739; Kamin, supra note 36, at 29 ("ITIhere
is certainly reason to suspect that the ability to create rules that would only be applied
prospectively encouraged the Warren Court to engage in the reshaping of criminal
procedure for which it is so well-known.").
180. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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to cases on direct review. This meant that as long as a defendant's
appeal was still pending, he could rely on any rule announced by the
Court, even after his conviction. 181 Second, in Teague v. Lane, 82 the
Court held that although new rules are retroactive on direct review,
they may not be applied to cases on collateral review except under
two very limited exceptions.'83 In addition, whereas the Warren and
Burger Courts had often announced a new rule and applied it to the
case at hand, 1"4 the plurality in Teague stated that a new rule could
never be the basis for a successful habeas petition.8 5
In articulating this doctrine, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
also provided procedural instructions to the lower courts. Because a
new rule could never be applied on collateral review, O'Connor
wrote, the threshold issue in every habeas case is whether the
petitioner's claim relies on a new rule of criminal procedure.186 If the
answer is yes, the court should dismiss the petition outright, without
considering the merits of the asserted rule.'87 If the answer is no, the
court should proceed to hear the habeas claim."8 O'Connor justified
this approach by reasoning that because a habeas petition may not be
granted on the basis of a new rule, any opinion expressed by the court
on the merits of the rule would be merely advisory. 89 A majority of
the Court adopted Justice O'Connor's procedural approach shortly
afterward in Saffle v. Parks.19
The core of Teague's holding was codified seven years later when
Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA).' 91 AEDPA provides that a federal court may
grant habeas relief to a state prisoner only if the state court judgment
181. See id. at 328.
182. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
183. See id. at 304-05. The two exceptions are for new rules that place "certain kinds
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe" and for new rules that require "the observance of those procedures
that... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 307 (citations and quotations
omitted).
184. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 299-300 (collecting cases).
185. See id. at 299-305.
186. See id. at 300-01.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 315-16. As explained in Part II, Justice Stevens objected to this
procedural approach.
190. 494 U.S. 484, 487-88 (1990). The Court also followed Justice O'Connor's
approach in Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 166-70 (1996) (rejecting petitioner's habeas
claim because it would require the adoption of a new rule).
191. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18,
22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
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was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.192 Like Teague,
AEDPA precludes federal courts from granting habeas relief on the
basis of new rules of criminal procedure. But AEDPA adds a twist,
declaring that only a rule established by the Supreme Court can serve
as the basis for a successful habeas petition. Rules recognized by
lower federal courts but not yet recognized by the Supreme Court
are, for habeas purposes at least, still "new."
The combined effect of Teague and AEDPA was largely to
exclude lower federal courts from the business of developing rules of
constitutional criminal procedure. 193  Although lower courts are
permitted to establish new rules in federal criminal cases, under
AEDPA those rules can never serve as the basis for habeas petitions
by state prisoners. Moreover, when a habeas petitioner asserts a new
rule of constitutional criminal procedure, Teague and Saffle instruct
courts to dismiss the petition outright, without expressing any view on
the merits of the petitioner's claim.
Numerous judges, advocates, and writers have criticized this state
of affairs.194 Because so few habeas petitions ever reach the Supreme
Court, critics argue that the law of constitutional criminal procedure
will stagnate, leaving state criminal defendants with no recourse to
challenge unfair state procedures. Critics also object to the inability
of lower federal courts to develop rules of criminal procedure.'95 As
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
193. See Kamin, supra note 36, at 33 (stating that Teague "spared the federal courts an
enormous amount of constitutional adjudication").
194. See, e.g., Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal
Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371, 373 (1991) (arguing that Teague will
shift the focus of federal courts away from the merits of habeas litigation and toward
procedural issues); Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to its Logical Extreme: A Comment on
Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2453, 2453 (1993) (arguing that "Teague v. Lane is a
decision which, on many levels, concerns the failure of judges to take responsibility for
their decisions"); John Blume & William Pratt, Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 326 (1990-1991) (concluding that "Teague does not
measurably contribute to either of the [Court's] proposed goals"); Barry Friedman,
Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 823 (1992) (stating that Teague redefines the
purposes of habeas corpus "in a way that seemingly will require flat-out repudiation to
change"); Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters": Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 423, 426 (1994) (commenting on "the broader jurisprudential implications of
Teague's 'new rule' doctrine," and arguing that "Teague threatens conventional
jurisprudence"); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2382
(1993) (arguing that Teague and subsequent decisions "threaten to establish a general rule
of deference to ordinary state judgments on the merits of federal claims").
195. See Bandes, supra note 194, at 2459 ("Teague's approach to controlling federal
judicial access had obvious and intentional consequences for the lower federal courts'
ability to participate in the evolution of constitutional standards for state criminal cases.
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Article III tribunals, these courts are empowered to "say what the law
is."' 96 Yet under Teague and AEDPA, they are not only forbidden
from saying what the law is in habeas cases, but anything they do say
cannot form the basis for a habeas petition.
19 7
Following the Court's announcement of its two-step process in
qualified immunity cases, some lower courts saw an opportunity to
correct this situation. In Van Tran v. Lindsey 98 the Ninth Circuit
held that when considering habeas petitions from state prisoners,
district courts must first determine whether the state court decision
was wrong and only then determine whether it was contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court
acknowledged that any new rule announced by a district court when
addressing the merits of a state court decision could never form the
basis for a habeas petition. But citing the Supreme Court's qualified
immunity cases, it reasoned that this approach would allow federal
courts to develop rules of criminal procedure that would at least
provide guidance for state judges. 99
Some circuit courts have criticized Van Tran, arguing that the
procedure for qualified immunity cases should not be applied in the
habeas context.3° But surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not
faulted the Ninth Circuit for ignoring Teague's procedural
instructions, despite several opportunities to do so. In Bell v. Cone,2"'
for instance, the Court considered an appeal from a Sixth Circuit
opinion granting a habeas petition for ineffective assistance of
counsel.202 Although several of the briefs described the dispute
between the Ninth Circuit and other courts and encouraged the
Justices to resolve it, the Court steered clear of the issue in its
ruling.2 °3 The Court did address the issue in the more recent case of
The rule announced in Teague prohibits lower federal courts from such participation.");
Friedman, supra note 194, at 823 ("Teague shuts down the habeas courts. Where once
these courts played an active, important role in defining the content of criminal procedure,
they now can do little but patrol the perimeters of criminal constitutional law.").
196. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
197. See Arkin, supra note 194, at 371 (arguing that Teague has curtailed the lower
federal courts' consideration of the merits in habeas cases); Meyer, supra note 194, at 423
(arguing that Teague "introduced the sweeping rule that 'new' constitutional law would be
neither announced nor applied in federal habeas corpus cases.").
198. 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000).
199. See id. at 1155.
200. See Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 161-62 (4th Cir. 2000); Francis v. Stone, 221 F.3d
100, 110 (2d Cir. 2000).
201. 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
202. Id. at 688-89.
203. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bell v. Cone, 2001 WL 34092010, at *20-23
(Aug. 30, 2001); Brief of Respondent, Bell v. Cone, 2002 WL 405097, at *41 (Mar. 4, 2002).
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Lockyer v. Andrade,2" but its discussion was far from a reaffirmation
of Teague:
The Ninth Circuit requires federal habeas courts to review the
state court decision de novo before applying the AEDPA
standard of review. We disagree with this approach. AEDPA
does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one
methodology in deciding the only question that matters under
§ 2254(d)()-whether a state court decision is contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
federal law. In this case, we do not reach the question whether
the state court erred and instead focus solely on whether
§ 2254(d) forecloses habeas relief on Andrade's Eighth
Amendment claim.2 °5
As a close reading of this paragraph shows, Andrade does not
state that lower courts are prohibited from reviewing the state court
decision de novo before applying the AEDPA standard. Instead, it
rejects the Ninth Circuit's holding that lower courts must review the
state court decision. The Court does note that the only decision that
matters under AEDPA is whether the state court decision was
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law." But it also points out that AEDPA does not
"require a federal habeas court to adopt any one methodology" in
deciding this question, meaning, presumably, that AEDPA does not
preclude federal courts from reviewing the state court decision de
novo before applying AEDPA. The Court seems to confirm this
meaning in the next sentence when it states, "In this case, we do not
reach the question whether the state court erred and instead focus
solely on whether § 2254(d) forecloses habeas relief on Andrade's
Eighth Amendment claim." This sentence suggests that the Court
has merely chosen not to reach the merits of the state court decision
in this case. Yet if AEDPA precluded federal courts from reviewing
the state court decision de novo, this choice would not be the Court's
to make. °6
The Justices did discuss the issue at oral argument, and a question asked by one of the
Justices is revealing: "Don't you think it would be a little coy for us to decide, well, it
wasn't an unreasonable application of---of federal law when we, in fact, know that-or
believe that it was a correct application of Federal law?" See Transcript of Oral
Argument, Bell v. Cone, 2002 WL 521361, at *10 (Mar. 25, 2002).
204. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
205. Id. at 71.
206. Since Andrade, the Ninth Circuit has abandoned its practice of reviewing the
merits of state court decisions before applying the AEDPA standard. See Kesser v.
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Another sign that the Court has abandoned Teague's procedural
approach is its own practice in post-AEDPA cases. In Weeks v.
Angelone,20 7 a state prisoner sentenced to death argued that the trial
judge had inadequately responded to a question from the jury about
mitigating factors.218  In considering the prisoner's habeas petition,
the Court first analyzed whether the Constitution required the judge
to do more than he did.2 °9 Only after answering no to that question
did the Court discuss the relevant standard under AEDPA and
conclude that the petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief.21° Thus,
Weeks followed the Ninth Circuit's approach of deciding the
underlying constitutional question before deciding the habeas issue.
The Court has not explained its neglect of Teague's procedural
instructions, and no explanation is readily apparent. 1' One might
suggest that because Teague's habeas standard was replaced by
AEDPA, Teague's holding on the proper procedural approach is no
longer valid. But this seems a stretch. Although AEDPA altered the
Teague standard, it also validated the entire framework for analyzing
habeas cases that Teague introduced. It seems unlikely, therefore,
that AEDPA overruled those aspects of Teague not directly
addressed by the statute. The more plausible view is that AEDPA's
silence on those aspects reflects Congressional approval of the
Court's opinion. Thus, the fact that Weeks and Andrade post-date
AEDPA does not sufficiently explain why the Court has seemingly
abandoned Teague's procedural framework.
Cambra, 2004 WL 2903976, at *9 (2004). But at least one Ninth Circuit opinion has
recognized that Andrade rejects only the circuit's requirement that lower courts first decide
the constitutional question, but does not prohibit them from doing so. See Clark v.
Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Thus, to the extent Van Tran and our
subsequent precedent requires a two-step consideration of habeas petitions, such
precedent has been overruled.").
207. 528 U.S. 225 (2000).
208. Id. at 230-31.
209. See id. at 234-37.
210. See id. at 237.
211. The Court's neglect cannot be explained by the fact that only a plurality of the
Court signed on to the procedural instructions in Teague. As pointed out above, a
majority of the Court later adopted Teague's procedural approach. See supra note 190 and
accompanying text.
212. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 (2000) ("It is perfectly clear that
AEDPA codifies Teague to the extent that Teague requires federal habeas courts to deny
relief that is contingent upon a rule of law not clearly established at the time the state
conviction became final."); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, § 15.4.1, at 880-81 (explaining
that AEDPA "essentially codifies" Teague); A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive
Application of "New Rules" and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 19 (2002) ("[A]ll nine Justices[] read AEDPA to codify some, but
not necessarily all, of the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence.").
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In the absence of a clear-cut explanation, it is worthwhile to
consider what the evolution of the Court's habeas doctrine reveals.
The Court's primary concern in Teague was to ensure that federal
courts would not overturn state court convictions on collateral review
unless the state court had departed from clearly established federal
rules.213 This approach had been advocated by Justice Harlan 14 and
fit nicely with the Rehnquist Court's emerging federalism
jurisprudence. But Teague revived an old dispute about the
application of new rules in cases in which they are announced. Under
the Warren Court's doctrine of non-retroactivity, when the Court
announced a new rule it often applied that rule to the case at hand.215
The reason for this practice was simple: if the new rule could not be
applied to the case at hand, defendants would have no incentive to
make novel constitutional arguments.216 Nevertheless, some members
of the Court objected to this practice, arguing that it was unfair for
one defendant to receive the benefit of the new rule, while other
defendants who were convicted at the same time were barred from
invoking the rule because of the doctrine of non-retroactivity. 217
The Court's embrace of retroactivity in Griffith v. Kentucky
resolved this problem for cases on direct review; now all defendants
whose direct appeals are pending receive the benefit of any new
213. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-10 (1989).
214. See id. (discussing Justice Harlan's views about the purpose of habeas corpus).
215. See id. at 299.
216. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 8, at 1806 (noting that if a court denies
"retroactive application to new law decisions on direct review ... criminal defendants
would have no adequate incentive to raise novel claims, and that there would be
insufficient opportunities for federal courts to expand the stock of recognized
constitutional rights"); Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term-Foreword: The
High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56,
60-61 (1965) (arguing that "[w]hen a new rule of law is given purely prospective effect, it
of course does not determine the judgment awarded in the case in which it is announced.
It follows that if parties anticipate such a prospective limitation, they will have no stimulus
to argue for change in the law.").
217. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 546-47 (1982) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "it is the nature of judicial review that precludes us from '[s]imply fishing
one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new
constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to
flow by unaffected by that new rule' "); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 257-58
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "all 'new' rules of constitutional law must, at a
minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct review by the Court
at the time the 'new' decision is handed down. Matters of basic principle are at stake.");
see also DeStafano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 n.2 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("We
see no basis for a distinction between convictions that have become final and cases at
various stages of trial and appeal."); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting) ("The Court offers no defense based on any known principle of justice for
discriminating against defendants who were similarly convicted.").
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rules.218 But when Teague held that new rules could not be applied
retroactively to habeas cases, the problem reappeared. This time,
however, the Court found a different solution. Instead of permitting
courts to apply new rules in the cases in which they were
announced-thus leading to inequality among habeas petitioners-
the Court held that new rules simply could not be announced in
habeas cases.2 19 This way, no one would benefit from new rules on
collateral review, and there would be no inequality among habeas
petitioners.2 °
As explained above, however, this resolution had its own
drawbacks, one of which was that it limited the ability of federal
courts-including the Supreme Court-to announce new rules of
constitutional criminal procedure. AEDPA only made matters worse
with its declaration that rules established by lower federal courts are
not binding on state courts and cannot serve as the basis for a
successful habeas petition. So it was not surprising when the Ninth
Circuit seized upon the Supreme Court's qualified immunity cases to
declare that lower courts should first address the merits of the
petitioner's claim before deciding whether to grant relief under
AEDPA. Nor is it entirely surprising that the Court has not rejected
this approach outright. Given its growing acceptance of the norm
declaration model, it makes sense that the Court would seek to
preserve opportunities for both itself and for the lower courts to
develop constitutional norms.
3. Fourth Amendment Good Faith Cases
The evolution of the Court's approach to Fourth Amendment
good faith cases is much shorter and simpler than the history of
habeas corpus and qualified immunity. But the pattern is the same.
The Court made an initial decision to relieve state actors from the
consequences of their unconstitutional conduct. Then, in order to
preserve opportunities for constitutional interpretation by the federal
courts, it authorized unnecessary constitutional rulings.
The story here revolves around the Court's decision in United
States v. Leon.221 The case grew out of a criminal trial in which the
district court suppressed evidence that was obtained with an invalid
218. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1987) (stating that "selective
application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the
same").
219. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315-16 (1989).
220. See id.
221. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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search warrant.22 Although the district court found that the officers
acted in good faith, it ruled that the magistrate should not have issued
the warrant because there was no probable cause.223 The government
appealed, arguing that because the officers had relied in good faith on
the search warrant, the evidence should be admitted. The Supreme
Court agreed. Asserting that the exclusionary rule was designed to
deter police misconduct, not errors by magistrates, it held that
evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search should not be
excluded at trial if the officers reasonably relied in good faith on a
search warrant later found invalid.22 4
In announcing this rule, the Court responded to a concern that
adoption of the good faith exception would preclude courts from
deciding the underlying constitutional issues in search and seizure
cases because they could simply skip to the question of good faith.
According to the Court, this concern was unfounded:
Nor are we persuaded that application of a good-faith
exception to searches will preclude review of the
constitutionality of the search or seizure, deny needed guidance
from the courts, or freeze Fourth Amendment law in its present
state. There is no need for courts to adopt the inflexible practice
of always deciding whether the officers' conduct manifested
objective good faith before turning to the question whether the
Fourth Amendment has been violated.... As cases addressing
questions of good-faith immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
cases involving the harmless-error doctrine make clear, courts
have considerable discretion in conforming their•
decisionmaking processes to the exigencies of particular
cases.
225
Three years later, the Court extended Leon in Illinois v. Krull,2 6
ruling that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search should not
be excluded if the officers reasonably relied on a statute authorizing
warrantless searches that was later declared invalid. 27 Once again,
the defendant argued that this outcome would eliminate incentives
for criminal defendants to challenge searches and would preclude
courts from ruling on the constitutionality of police action. And once
222. Id. at 901-05.
223. See id. at 903-04.
224. See id. at 909.
225. Id. at 924-25 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
226. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
227. See id. at 349-50.
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again, the Court dismissed this concern, citing its statement in Leon
that application of the good-faith exception would not "preclude
review of the constitutionality of the search or seizure" and would not
"cause defendants to lose their incentive to litigate meritorious
Fourth Amendment claims. 2
28
Leon and Krull demonstrate that the Court's embrace of
unnecessary constitutional rulings can be seen, at least in part, as a
response to developments that would otherwise limit the opportunity
for federal courts to engage in constitutional interpretation. The
Court's decisions in these cases eliminated the need for federal courts
to decide the constitutional issue in cases where the officers acted in
good faith. Indeed, a court looking to save time would almost
certainly decide the issue of good faith first and only address the
constitutional issue if necessary. But the Court appears concerned
about the inability of federal courts to decide the constitutional issue
in these cases. So as it has done in other contexts, the Court
authorized lower courts to decide the constitutional issue even when
doing so is not necessary to resolve the case.
4. Harmless Error
Harmless error is a relatively recent doctrine. For the first 130
years after the founding, American courts followed the English rule
that any error in a criminal trial was grounds for automatic reversal. 29
This rule was based largely on respect for the jury; if appellate courts
upheld convictions that resulted from flawed trials, they would usurp
the jury's role as the ultimate decider of guilt or innocence .230 But the
rule also had drawbacks. Courts often reversed convictions for minor
errors, such as misplaced words in an indictment.23 Lawyers took
advantage of this situation, finding ways to plant errors in the trial
record in the event they were forced to appeal.232
228. Id. at 353-54 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 & n.25 (1984)).
229. See Kamin, supra note 36, at 9-10.
230. See Donald A. Winslow, Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases,
64 CORNELL L. REV. 538, 540 (1979).
231. One of the most egregious examples is State v. Campbell, 109 S.W. 706 (Mo. 1908),
in which a state appellate court reversed a rape conviction because the indictment alleged
that the rape occurred "against the peace and dignity of state" rather than "against the
peace and dignity of the state." See id. at 707-13 (emphasis added); see also Williams v.
State, 27 Wis. 402, 402-03 (1871) (reversing conviction because indictment read "against
the peace of the State of Wisconsin" instead of "against the peace and dignity of the
State"); People v. Vice, 21 Cal. 345, 345 (1863) (reversing robbery conviction because the
indictment failed to allege that the property stolen did not belong to the defendant).
232. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946) (describing abuses under
the rule of automatic reversal).
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Congress responded to this problem in 1919 with legislation that
instructed federal appellate courts to give judgment "without regard
to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties." '233 Under this rule, courts would not
reverse convictions for non-constitutional errors that were deemed
"harmless." But they continued automatically to reverse
constitutional errors until 1967. In that year, the Supreme Court held
in Chapman v. CaliforniaM that the harmless error rule could be
applied to the violation of some constitutional rights if a court found
that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 235
Both before and after Chapman, appellate courts often used the
harmless error rule as a way to avoid deciding difficult questions.236
The Supreme Court also occasionally took this approach. In Milton
v. Wainwright,237 for instance, a habeas petitioner argued that his right
to counsel was violated when the jury was told of a confession he
made to an undercover police officer posing as a fellow prisoner.238
But the Court declined to reach the merits of his claim, ruling that
any error in the trial was "beyond reasonable doubt, harmless. '239
Although this practice was relatively uncontroversial, some
writers questioned it. "The purpose of the harmless error doctrine is
to save the time and effort of retrial," wrote one commentator. "It
was not meant to shelter courts from difficult questions of law. '2 41
Judge Harry Edwards expressed a similar view, arguing that when
courts sidestep "an important question of trial error," they offer no
233. Judicial Code of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, § 269 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 391 (1946)) (repealed 1948). The law is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2000).
234. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
235. Id. at 24.
236. See United States v. Allen, 960 F.2d 1055, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1992), United States v.
Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 500-02 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 227, 235
(9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Mackay, 571 F.2d 376, 384-90 (7th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Bynum, 566 F.2d 914, 926 (5th Cir. 1978); Wright v. Estelle, 549 F.2d 971, 974 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 213 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Pravato, 505 F.2d 703, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1974). Courts also occasionally decided the issues
in the opposite order. See Sanders v. Lane, 861 F.2d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988); Fleming v.
Kemp, 837 F.2d 940, 948 (11th Cir. 1988); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 875 (5th Cir.
1980); Arias v. United States, 484 F.2d 577, 578-79 (7th Cir. 1973).
237. 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
238. Id. at 372, 378.
239. Id.; see also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576 n.5 (1986) (assuming that the court of
appeals properly held that jury instructions were unconstitutional, but dismissing the case
under harmless error analysis); United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.4 (1983)
(granting certiorari only on harmless error issue and declining to reach merits of criminal
defendants' claim).
240. See Winslow, supra note 230, at 542.
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guidance to trial courts.24'
Abruptly, and with little fanfare, the Court also adopted this
position. In Lockhart v. Fretwell,242 a habeas petitioner argued that he
had received ineffective assistance of counsel.2 43  Although the
government did not dispute that his attorney's performance was
deficient, it argued that the petitioner had not been prejudiced.2" In
accepting this argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
disputed the dissent's claim that the Court was engaging in harmless-
error analysis. "Contrary to the dissent's suggestion," he wrote in a
footnote, "today's decision does not involve or require a harmless-
error inquiry. Harmless error analysis is triggered only after the
reviewing court discovers that an error has occurred. 24
5
Rehnquist did not explain the rationale behind this statement,
and the Court has not cited his footnote in Fretwell since. As a result,
lower courts seem not to be taking the Court's instruction seriously.
Although some courts occasionally follow the Fretwell approach,246
others continue to avoid the merits and to proceed straight to the
question of harmlessness. 47
But at least one recent case suggests that the Court meant what it
said in Fretwell. In Jones v. United States,248 the defendant appealed
his death sentence, arguing that the jury's consideration of certain
aggravating factors violated the Eighth Amendment. 49 The appeals
court agreed with the defendant's claim, but upheld his sentence on
the ground that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.25 °
On review before the Supreme Court, the government defended the
sentence not only on harmless error grounds but also on grounds that
there was no error. 1  Justice Ginsburg contended that the
government had waived this argument because it did not challenge
the circuit court's ruling in its opposition to certiorari and because the
241. See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When
Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1182 (1995).
242. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
243. Id. at 366.
244. Id. at 370 n.1.
245. Id. at 370 n.2.
246. See, e.g., United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276, 291 (5th Cir. 2001);
Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 949 (3rd Cir. 1998).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002); Toles v.
Gibson, 269 F.3d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 273
(4th Cir. 2000).
248. 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
249. See id. at 384.
250. See id. at 396.
251. See id.
893
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question on certiorari, which the government had reformulated,
presumed that error had occurred.2 She also noted that a decision
on the sentencing claim was unnecessary because a majority of the
Court agreed that any error was harmless.Y3 But writing for the
majority, Justice Thomas decided the merits of the sentencing claim
254anyway. Rejecting Ginsburg's view that the government had
waived this argument, Thomas wrote that "[a]ssessing the error
(including whether there was error at all) is essential to an intelligent
resolution of whether such error was harmless. 25 5 He then decided
the claim in the government's favor.256
Thomas did not explain why deciding whether an error occurred
is essential to an intelligent resolution of the harmless error question,
and his assertion seems questionable. It is true that a court needs to
understand the precise nature of the error alleged by the defendant in
order to decide whether such an error could ever be harmless. A
court also must understand exactly what effect the defendant claims
the alleged error had on the trial. But a court does not need to decide
whether the actions complained of by the defendant amounted to
error in order to determine whether those actions affected the
outcome of the trial.257 The two questions are distinct, and courts
have been intelligently deciding the latter question by itself for many
years.
So what explains the Court's approach in the harmless error
context? It is worth noting that here, as in the qualified immunity
context, the Court has embraced unnecessary constitutional rulings in
cases in which it has denied the underlying constitutional claim. In
Fretwell, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, while in Jones, Justice Thomas
rejected the defendant's Eighth Amendment claim. It is also worth
noting that, as in the other areas in which the Court has authorized
unnecessary constitutional rulings, earlier developments limited the
extent to which federal courts engaged in constitutional analysis.
Prior to the emergence of harmless error, appellate courts always
252. See id. at 420 n.24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
253. See id.
254. See id. at 396-97.
255. Id. at 397 n.12.
256. See id. at 398-402.
257. But see Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article II1, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2046
(1994) (arguing that "it simply makes more sense to resolve the question whether there
was any error before deciding whether a putative error was harmless" because "until the
court passes on the substantive question, it will not know exactly what the error is that it
must test for harmlessness").
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addressed the underlying constitutional issue because any error was
subject to automatic reversal. But that changed after Chapman.
Instead of deciding important constitutional issues, appellate courts
became reviewers of fact: did the alleged error affect the outcome of
the trial? This was a significant change in the role of the courts, and it
occurred just as the Supreme Court began to expand its jurisdiction
and assert the exclusive competence of the federal courts to decide
constitutional questions. Thus, one might view the Court's embrace
of unnecessary constitutional rulings in harmless error cases as an
effort to restore a role for the federal courts that, at least for a time,
had become diminished.
II. UNNECESSARY CONSTITUTIONAL RULINGS AND THE BAN ON
ADVISORY OPINIONS
Regardless of why the Court has embraced unnecessary
constitutional rulings, its recent approach raises important questions.
In this Part, I address one of those questions, which is whether
unnecessary constitutional rulings can be squared with the ban on
advisory opinions. I begin by describing the ban on advisory opinions
and one of its underlying principles, which is that courts may not issue
rulings that will not have an effect on the outcome of a dispute
between adverse litigants. I then explain why this principle raises
serious questions about the practice of issuing unnecessary
constitutional rulings in qualified immunity, habeas corpus, harmless
error, and Fourth Amendment good faith cases. Finally, I consider
counterarguments and conclude that although deciding the
underlying merits in harmless error and Fourth Amendment good
faith cases may not violate the ban on advisory opinions, reaching the
merits in qualified immunity and habeas cases does.
A. The Effect Principle
The ban on advisory opinions is as old and well established as
any of the justiciability doctrines. 8  Rooted in the "case or
controversy" requirement of Article III, it prohibits federal courts
from deciding legal questions in the absence of an actual dispute
between adverse litigants.25 9 This means that courts cannot answer
legal questions submitted to them by the political branches for
258. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 65 (5th ed. 1994)
(describing the ban on advisory opinions as "the oldest and most consistent thread in the
federal law of justiciability").
259. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, § 2.2, at 48-49.
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advice, 260 nor can they hear suits in which the plaintiff and defendant
have colluded to bring an issue before the courts for resolution.261
The ban on advisory opinions also prevents courts from deciding
questions that will not have any effect on the litigants before them.262
Thus, the courts could not participate in a legislative scheme for
awarding benefits to Revolutionary War veterans that permitted the
Secretary of War to overrule their recommendations. 263 As five of the
six Justices explained in separate opinions while riding circuit,
permitting the courts to issue opinions that could be "revised and
controuled [sic] by the legislature, and by an officer in the executive
department" is "radically inconsistent with the independence of that
judicial power which is vested in the courts."264  The full Court
embraced this reasoning in a later case, stating that to decide a
question that could be modified by the President "would be to render
an advisory opinion in its most obnoxious form. '265
Despite its centrality to Article III, the ban on advisory opinions
is rarely enforced as a separate doctrine. Instead, it is usually
implemented through other justiciability doctrines, such as standing,
ripeness, and mootness.266 For instance, the principle that courts may
issue rulings only in the context of an actual dispute between adverse
litigants is given force through the doctrine of standing, which limits
the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases in which the plaintiff has
suffered a concrete injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant's
conduct.267 The presence of an actual dispute is also ensured by the
ripeness doctrine, which prohibits courts from deciding cases in which
the injury alleged by the plaintiff has not already occurred or is not
imminent.268
260. See Correspondence of the Justices (1793), reprinted in HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 37, at 78-79.
261. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (dismissing a suit brought
by the plaintiff at the request of the defendant, who also paid for and directed the suit).
262. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, § 2.2, at 53.
263. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409-10 (1792).
264. Id. at 411.
265. See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 114 (1948)
(dismissing as nonjusticiable a case in which the Court was asked to review Civil
Aeronautics Board decisions because the president retained the power to ignore the
Court's decision); see also United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52 (1852)
(dismissing claims under a treaty for lack of jurisdiction because the secretary of treasury
could refuse payment of claims if he deemed them not to be just and equitable).
266. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, § 2.2, at 56.
267. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("A plaintiff must allege personal
injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.").
268. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (asserting the "basic
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The principle that courts may issue only rulings that will have
some effect on the parties before it-what I will call the "effect
principle"-is also reflected in a variety of justiciability doctrines. To
begin with, the principle can be seen as the basis for the redressability
prong of the standing doctrine.269 Under this prong, a plaintiff has
standing-and a court has jurisdiction-only if the injury complained
of would be redressed by a ruling in the plaintiff's favor.27° In Warth
v. Seldin,27' for instance, the plaintiffs challenged zoning laws in
Penfield, New York that prevented multifamily dwellings and low-
income housing. 72 The plaintiffs argued that the zoning laws injured
them by making it more difficult to find affordable housing in
Penfield.273  But the Court held that the plaintiffs failed the
redressability requirement. Even if the laws were struck down, the
Court explained, there was no assurance that builders would choose
to construct low-income housing in Penfield or, if they did, that the
plaintiffs would be able to afford to live there.274 Thus, a ruling in the
plaintiffs' favor was not likely to have any effect on their lives.275
The effect principle is also reflected in the mootness doctrine,
which prohibits federal courts from deciding cases in which the
dispute between the parties has been resolved or is no longer live.
Mootness has been described as the "doctrine of standing set in a
rationale" of the ripeness doctrine "is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements"); see also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (noting that plaintiff's injury must
be, among other things, actual and imminent); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 498
(1974) ("[T]he threat of injury of the alleged course of conduct they attack is simply too
remote to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement and permit adjudication by a
federal court.").
269. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 635, 647 (1985) (noting that the redressability requirement "prevents
judicial decrees that have no effect in the real world").
270. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38
(1976) ("In sum, when a plaintiff's standing is brought into issue, the relevant inquiry is
whether ... the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.").
271. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
272. See id. at 493.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 505-06.
275. Id. at 508 ("We hold only that a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary
zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged
practices harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the
court's intervention.") (emphasis in original); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 619 (1973) (affirming dismissal for want of redressability, and holding that the
"appellant has made an insufficient showing of a direct nexus between the vindication of
her interest, and the enforcement of the State's criminal laws[,]" where an unwed mother
sought to have her child's father prosecuted for failure to pay child support).
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time frame. The requisite personal interest that must exist at the
commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout
its existence (mootness)." '276  More precisely, mootness is the
redressability prong of standing in a time frame. The plaintiff may
still be able to satisfy the first two prongs of the standing
requirement-that is, he may have suffered an injury in fact that is
fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct. But either because the
injury is no longer palpable or because the parties have agreed to a
resolution of their dispute, a decision by the court can no longer
redress the harm of which the plaintiff initially complained.277
A classic case of mootness is DeFunis v. Odegaard,278 in which a
white college student was denied admission to the University of
Washington Law School. The student sued, arguing that the school's
affirmative action policy discriminated against him on the basis of his
race.279 While the student's suit was pending, the trial court granted
an injunction permitting him to enroll in the school and begin his
studies. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the student
was in his third year, and school officials said they would not seek to
prevent him from graduating.20 Raising the issue of mootness on its
own, the Court cited "the familiar proposition that 'federal courts are
without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of
litigants in the case before them.' ",281 It then concluded that the case
was moot because "in no event will the status of DeFunis now be
affected by any view this Court might express on the merits of this
controversy." 282
The third area in which the effect principle can be seen is the
State Grounds doctrine. Under this doctrine, the Court has held that
it lacks jurisdiction to review state court rulings on issues of federal
law if the state court judgment is based on an adequate and
276. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE
L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973). But see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167,190 (2000) (rejecting this comparison between mootness and standing).
277. For example, in Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1975), a public high school
student argued that mandatory ROTC instruction violated his. First Amendment rights.
Id. at 174. The court dismissed his claim for declaratory relief as moot, but not because
the student did not suffer an injury. Instead, the court dismissed the student's claim
because he had already graduated from a private high school, meaning that a declaration
in his favor could no longer remedy the student's injury. See id. at 175-76.
278. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
279. See id. at 314.
280. See id. at 315-16 & n.2.
281. Id. at 316 (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)).
282. Id. at 317.
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independent state law ground.283 Although the Judiciary Act gives
the Supreme Court authority to review state court pronouncements
on federal law, the Court has interpreted the Act to prohibit review
of state court decisions on state law questions.284 Therefore, if a state
court judgment is based on an independent and adequate state law
ground, the Supreme Court's review of the federal law issue can have
no effect on the state court judgment. "[Olur power is to correct
wrong judgments, not to revise opinions," the Court has explained.285
"We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same
judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its
views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than
an advisory opinion. 28
6
Finally, the Court has endorsed the effect principle in its
discussions of retroactivity and prospectivity. During the Warren era,
the Court held that it would not apply new rules of constitutional law
automatically to cases pending on direct review, but would instead
conduct a balancing test to determine which rules would be applied
retroactively.2 7 Although the Court usually applied new rules in the
cases in which they were announced, it initially suggested that even
this was not required and that purely prospective decisions-that is,
decisions that only apply to future cases-posed no constitutional
problems.288 Shortly afterward, in Stovall v. Denno,2 89 the Court sent
283. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1995); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1040-41 (1983).
284. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630-31 (1875).
285. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945).
286. Id.; see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983); South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553, 569 n.3 (1983). The Court has also declined to review federal issues decided by
lower courts where the lower court judgment is adequately supported by some ground
beyond the Supreme Court's review. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455
U.S. 283, 292-95 (1982) (refusing to examine lower court's interpretation of federal
Constitution because lower court also based its decision on state constitution, and
Congress did not give Supreme Court jurisdiction over the state law issue); United States
v. Hastings, 296 U.S. 188, 193 (1935) (holding review of a federal court "judgment which
we cannot disturb, because it rests adequately upon a basis not subject to our examination,
would be an anomaly"). But unlike in the State Grounds cases, the Court has not stated
clearly whether this approach is required by Article III or is simply a prudential policy
grounded in the principle of avoiding unnecessary constitutional rulings.
287. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) (stating that the Court will
"weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in
question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard
its operation").
288. See id. at 621-22 & n.3 (1965) (noting that "[i]t has been suggested that this Court
is prevented by Article III from adopting the technique of purely prospective overruling,"
but citing cases in which the Court had done just that).
289. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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a different message, stating that "[s]ound policies of decision-making,
rooted in the command of Article III of the Constitution that we
resolve issues solely in concrete cases or controversies, ... militate
against" pure prospectivity 9 °
The Court's about-face on pure prospectivity was mostly a result
of the larger debate about retroactivity. Critics of the Court's
retroactivity doctrine argued that not applying new rules of
constitutional law to cases pending on direct review resulted in
inequitable treatment of similarly situated defendants.2 91  Because
new rules were usually applied in the cases in which they were
announced, critics maintained, it was unfair to deny defendants in
other pending cases the benefit of the same rules. 92 But defenders of
non-retroactivity argued that this inequity was "an unavoidable
consequence of the necessity that constitutional adjudications not
stand as mere dictum. '293  In other words, the Court was not
permitted to announce a new rule'without applying it to the case at
hand, but it did have discretion to determine whether that rule should
apply retroactively to other cases.
Although the Court's views on pure prospectivity may have been
influenced by its defense of non-retroactivity, the Court has largely
adhered to its position in Stovall-despite having since overhauled its
retroactivity doctrine. 94  In Harper v. Virginia Department of
Taxation,295 for instance, the Court rejected non-retroactivity in civil
cases, holding that "[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to
the parties before it, that rule ... must be given full retroactive effect
in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless
of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the
rule. 2 96  The Court did not directly address the issue of "pure
prospectivity," but suggested that purely prospective decisions exceed
the judicial power under Article 111.297 Justice Scalia was more
290. See id. at 301.
291. See supra note 218 and accompanying text; see also Mishkin, supra note 216, at 74-
76 (arguing against using the date a criminal defendant's conviction became final as the
basis for whether a new rule of constitutional law will apply to his case).
292. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
293. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254-55 n.24 (1969) (quoting Stovall, 388 U.S.
at 301).
294. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 75 (noting that since Stovall, "pure
prospectivity has seldom been treated as a live alternative").
295. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
296. Id. at 97. The Court had earlier rejected non-retroactivity in criminal cases. See
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
297. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97 (stating that "[t]he Court has no more constitutional
authority in civil cases than in criminal cases to disregard current law"); see also id. at 115
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explicit. In a concurring opinion, he argued that prospective
decisionmaking of any sort is "the handmaid of judicial activism" and
"quite incompatible with the judicial power. 2 98
A majority of the Court has embraced a similar view in habeas
corpus cases. In Teague v. Lane,2 99 the Court held that new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure would not be applied in
cases that became final before the rules were announced. A plurality
of the Court also stated that because habeas petitioners could not
benefit from new rules, of constitutional law, courts could not
announce new rules in habeas cases.3" If a court announced a new
rule on habeas, the plurality explained, it would have to apply that
rule to the petitioner at hand because of "the necessity that
constitutional adjudications not stand as mere dictum.""3 1  By
declining to announce new rules of constitutional procedure on
habeas, however, courts would "avoid rendering advisory opinions"
and ensure that all similarly situated petitioners were treated
equally." Justice Stevens disagreed with that part of the plurality
opinion, arguing that a habeas court should first determine "whether
the trial process violated any of the petitioner's constitutional rights"
before deciding whether the petitioner is entitled to relief.3 3 But a
majority of the Court has since embraced the Teague approach,3"
strongly suggesting that purely prospective decisions violate Article
III.
B. Constitutional Rulings Without Effect
The principles discussed above raise serious questions about the
practice of deciding the constitutional issue in qualified immunity,
habeas corpus, harmless error, and Fourth Amendment good faith
cases. In these cases, a ruling on the constitutional issue often has no
effect because the court's determination that the governmental actor
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion "intimates that pure
prospectivity may be prohibited as well"); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 76
(observing that "much of the opinion's reasoning raises doubts that the Court would
regard purely prospective adjudication as legitimate").
298. Harper, 509 U.S. at 105-06 (Scalia, J., concurring).
299. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
300. Id. at 315-16.
301. Id. at 315 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967)).
302. See id. at 316. An oddity about Teague is that it was written by Justice O'Connor,
who in her Harper dissent had criticized the majority for suggesting that purely
prospective decisions were unconstitutional. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 115-17 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
303. See id. at 318-19 & n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
304. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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has immunity or that an error was harmless is adequate to resolve the
dispute. In qualified immunity cases, for instance, a decision that the
plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right is
immaterial if the court finds that the right was not clearly established
at the time of the events giving rise to the lawsuit. Because
government officials can be held liable in damages only for violating
rights that are clearly established,3"5 the court will dismiss the lawsuit
in spite of its conclusion that the constitutional right exists. Likewise,
a decision that a state court incorrectly applied the Constitution has
no effect on the outcome of a habeas case if the federal court also
determines that the state court judgment was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as
articulated by the Supreme Court.30 6
One might respond that a court cannot know whether its decision
on the constitutional issue will have some effect until after it
determines whether the governmental actor has immunity or the
error was harmless. Therefore, as long as a court decides the
constitutional issue first, it will not knowingly issue an ineffectual
ruling. But at least with respect to qualified immunity and habeas
cases, this argument is unpersuasive. In these two contexts, a decision
on the constitutional issue can never have any independent effect and
can never change the outcome of the case. The reason is that a
decision on the non-constitutional issue is always sufficient to resolve
the case. To see this point more clearly, consider the possible
combinations of rulings available in a qualified immunity case:
(1) The right exists and is clearly established.
(2) The right exists, but is not clearly established.
(3) The right does not exist, and is not clearly established.3 7
Under the first scenario, the court's ruling that the right is clearly
established necessarily answers the question whether the right exists.
Therefore, a decision that the right exists is superfluous and has no
independent effect on the outcome of the case.308 Under the second
305. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
306. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003);
Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 237 (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 434 (2000).
307. Note that, with one theoretical exception, a court could never decide that the right
is clearly established, but does not exist. See infra note 309.
308. In Part II.C.1, I explain why a court does not need to determine whether the right
exists in order to decide whether it is clearly established.
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and third scenarios, a decision that the right is not clearly established
does not tell us whether the right exists. But because a defendant has
qualified immunity if the right is not clearly established, deciding
whether the right exists can make no difference. Either way, the case
must be dismissed, and a ruling on the constitutional issue can have
no effect. The same is true in habeas cases. A decision that the state
court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law necessarily means that the state court
incorrectly interpreted the Constitution. And if the state court
decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established law, a ruling that the state court decision is incorrect is
immaterial.3"
This analysis illustrates that in qualified immunity and habeas
cases, a court always knows in advance that its decision on the
constitutional issue will not affect the outcome of the case. It can
therefore proceed straight to the non-constitutional issue to fulfill its
duty of resolving the case. But the same is not true in harmless error
and Fourth Amendment good faith cases. In these cases, a decision
on the constitutional issue can sometimes affect the outcome of the
case, and a court will not know whether this is so until after it
addresses the non-constitutional issue. This is because a decision on
the non-constitutional issue (harmlessness and good faith) is not
always sufficient to resolve the case. Again, we can see the point
most clearly by considering the possible combinations of rulings
available in a harmless error case:
(1) The conduct complained of is unconstitutional and
harmless.
(2) The conduct complained of is constitutional and harmless.
(3) The conduct complained of is unconstitutional and not
harmless.
309. There is one caveat to my claim that a decision on the constitutional merits can
never have any independent effect in qualified immunity and habeas cases. It is possible
that even if the right is clearly established, the defendant could argue that the right does
not exist. In other words, the defendant could acknowledge that the right was established
by an earlier case, but then argue that the earlier case was an incorrect interpretation of
the Constitution and should be overruled. In this situation, a decision on the
constitutional issue would have independent effect and could change the outcome of the
case. But because I am unaware of any cases in which defendants have made such an
argument (let alone any cases in which a court has accepted such an argument), I view this
as a theoretical caveat that does not undermine my basic claim.
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(4) The conduct complained of is constitutional and not
harmless.
Under the first and second scenarios, a decision that the conduct
complained of was harmless makes it unnecessary for the court to
consider whether the conduct is unconstitutional. Even if it is, the
defendant's conviction must be affirmed.310 But a decision that the
conduct was not harmless under the third and fourth scenarios does
not resolve the case. Because a finding that the conduct was not
harmless does not tell us anything about whether the conduct was
constitutional, a court must still proceed to answer that question."a
Its decision on the constitutional issue will thus determine the
outcome of the case. The same is true in Fourth Amendment good
faith cases. If the court rules that the officer acted in good faith, there
is no reason to determine whether the search violated the Fourth
Amendment. But if the officer did not have a good faith belief in the
validity of the search, the Fourth Amendment issue becomes
dispositive.
In harmless error and Fourth Amendment good faith cases, then,
a decision on the constitutional issue can sometimes affect the
outcome of the case. And because a court will not know whether its
constitutional ruling makes a difference until after it decides the non-
constitutional issue, one might argue that a court does not knowingly
issue an ineffectual ruling when it decides the constitutional issue
first. But this argument has two flaws. First, courts rarely issue
decisions instantaneously from the bench.312 Instead, judges typically
write their opinions in chambers over several weeks or months and
release the decision only when it is complete. So although a court
may not know when it sets out to resolve the constitutional issue
whether its ruling on that issue will have some effect, it certainly
knows before it releases the opinion. And if the court proceeds to
announce a ruling on the constitutional issue even though the non-
310. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2000); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
311. It may seem odd to suggest that conduct that is "not harmless" to the defendant
could be constitutional. But "not harmless" in this sense means simply that the conduct
had an effect on the outcome of the trial. See Kamin, supra note 36, at 6 n.15 (defining
harmless error). Thus, the introduction of incriminating evidence might be viewed as "not
harmless" to the defendant even though the evidence was obtained in a constitutionally
valid search.
312. Decisions from the bench are more common in district courts than in appellate
courts. But with the exception of Motions to Reconsider under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 59(e), harmless error cases are always heard in appellate courts. It is true that
district courts often decide search claims under the "good faith" doctrine, but it is unclear
how often judges issue these opinions from the bench immediately after argument.
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constitutional issue is dispositive, it has knowingly decided a question
"that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before [it]. ' 313
Second, strategically ordering the questions to avoid an Article
III problem would seem foreclosed by the Supreme Court's approach
to cases involving the State Grounds doctrine. In these cases, the
Court does not know whether a decision on the federal issue will have
some effect until after it determines whether the state court judgment
rests on an adequate and independent state ground. Thus, the Court
could conceivably decide the federal issue first and then decide
whether the state court judgment rests on an adequate and
independent state ground. But the Court does not follow that
approach.314 Instead, the Court first determines whether there is an
adequate and independent state ground. Only if there is not (i.e.,
only if a ruling on the federal issue can affect the outcome of the
dispute) does the Court proceed to decide the federal issue. Thus,
even in harmless error and Fourth Amendment good faith cases,
unnecessary constitutional rulings would seem to violate the effect
principle.
C. Counterarguments
As the preceding Section shows, a strong case can be made that
unnecessary constitutional rulings in qualified immunity, habeas
corpus, harmless error, and Fourth Amendment good faith cases
violate the ban on advisory opinions. Before drawing any firm
conclusions, however, several objections need to be considered. First,
some scholars have argued that the State Grounds doctrine is not
required by the ban on advisory opinions. If correct, this argument
might undermine the claim that unnecessary constitutional rulings in
other areas violate the ban on advisory opinions. Second, the analysis
above raises questions about dicta and alternative holdings. Courts
often make statements that are unnecessary to the resolution of a case
and occasionally rely on alternative holdings to support their
judgment. These rulings rarely have any effect on the outcome of a
dispute, yet they are prevalent and generally accepted. So if these
rulings are not cause for great concern, one might question whether
we should worry about unnecessary constitutional rulings in other
313. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974).
314. Although the Court does not follow that approach now, it did at one time. See
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 634-36 (1874) (holding that a court
should first decide the federal issue before determining whether state law grounds are
sufficient to support the state court judgment).
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contexts.315
1. The State Grounds Doctrine and the Ban on Advisory Opinions
The claim that the State Grounds doctrine is not required by the
ban on advisory opinions has been made most forcefully by Richard
Matasar and Gregory Bruch. They argue that the ban serves two
main purposes: (1) to ensure that issues are presented in an
adversarial context that will facilitate judicial review; and (2) to
promote the finality of judicial action "essential to the maintenance of
separation of powers within the national government. '316  Matasar
and Bruch then argue that neither purpose is undermined when the
Supreme Court reviews a state court judgment supported by
adequate and independent state grounds. Because the parties are
engaged in an actual controversy, they argue, the federal issue is
presented as part of a concrete dispute, not a hypothetical question.317
They also maintain that there is little threat to the finality of the
Court's ruling on the federal issue. Unlike Hayburn's Case,318 where
other branches of the government retained authority to review
federal court decisions, no branch of the federal government has
authority to review the Supreme Court's ruling on the federal issue.
Matasar and Bruch acknowledge that a state court can render a
Supreme Court ruling ineffectual by issuing the same judgment on the
basis of state law. But as they point out, this raises federalism
concerns, not separation of powers concerns.31 9 And in any event,
315. A third possible objection is that there is a difference between deciding an issue
that will not have any effect on the outcome of a dispute and deciding a case in which the
court's judgment can have no effect. Under this theory, the ban on advisory opinions
would prohibit a court from resolving a case in which the plaintiff lacked standing entirely,
but would not prohibit a court from resolving a particular issue as to which the plaintiff
lacked standing if some other aspect of the case were justiciable. But the Court has
rejected this theory, holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim and
form of relief sought. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt'l Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (stating that "a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for
each form of relief sought"); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996) ("[S]tanding is
not dispensed in gross."); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (holding
that plaintiff lacks standing to bring claim for injunctive relief even though he has standing
to bring claim for damages). Moreover, the concerns underlying the ban on advisory
opinions-preserving the separation of powers and ensuring informed judicial decision-
making-would seem to be equally implicated in both situations. If a court decides an
issue that is not capable of judicial resolution or that was not presented in an adversarial
context, it is hard to see why that should be permissible simply because the court also
decides an issue that is justiciable.
316. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 44, at 1302.
317. See id. at 1302-03.
318. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 412-13 (1792).
319. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 44, at 1304-05.
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they argue, the State Grounds doctrine does not entirely eliminate
this concern. Even where the state court judgment is not initially
supported by an adequate and independent state ground-so that
there is no bar to deciding the federal issue-the state court can
always render the Supreme Court's ruling ineffectual by subsequently
finding a state law ground to support its initial judgment.32
If the State Grounds doctrine is not required by the ban on
advisory opinions, one might question whether unnecessary
constitutional rulings in qualified immunity, habeas corpus, harmless
error and Fourth Amendment good faith cases violate Article III. In
these cases, as in cases involving the State Grounds doctrine, the
issues are framed by a concrete dispute between adverse parties; the
courts are not asked to decide hypothetical or abstract questions. In
addition, rulings on the constitutional issues in these cases are not
subject to review by the other branches of government. It is true that
if a constitutional ruling is not dispositive (for example, if a court
rules that the constitutional right exists, but was not clearly
established), the other branches can ignore that ruling and still
comply with the Court's judgment. But because courts generally
apply stare decisis to these rulings,32 they will serve as precedent in
later cases, and the other branches will then be obligated to comply
with them.
One problem with this line of reasoning is that, according to the
Court, the State Grounds doctrine is required by the ban on advisory
opinions. Although Matasar and Bruch argue that the Court has only
"suggested" as much,322 the Court has been much more explicit. In
320. See id. at 1306. Matasar and Bruch cite several cases in which state courts
rendered Supreme Court rulings on a federal law ineffectual "on the basis of new state law
issues, unclearly resolved state issues, or even state issues that previously had been
determined differently." Id. at 1306 & nn.58-60. In most cases, however, one would
expect that the doctrine of waiver and the law of the case would foreclose such efforts.
321. The Court has never explicitly stated that unnecessary constitutional rulings in
qualified immunity and habeas cases are binding precedent, but it seems safe to assume
that they are intended to be. The primary reason for deciding the constitutional issue is so
that rights can become clearly established for purposes of later cases. See Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Yet if a ruling on the constitutional issue were not binding, that
purpose would be defeated since dicta cannot be the basis for a holding that a right is
clearly established. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (noting that the
phrase "clearly established Federal law," as that term appears in AEDPA, "refers to the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions"); Hamilton v. Cannon, 80 F.3d
1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1995) ("The law cannot be established by dicta. Dicta is particularly
unhelpful in qualified immunity cases where we seek to identify clearly established law.").
In any event, nearly all courts treat these rulings as binding precedent, which means that,
for all practical purposes, they are.
322. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 44, at 1301 ("The Court has suggested a second
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Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,32 3 the Court held that "where the judgment
of the state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and
the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-
federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to
support the judgment." '324 Likewise, in Herb v. Pitcairn,325 the Court
stated that its "power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise
opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if
the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we
corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to
nothing more than an advisory opinion. '3 26
The Court weakened the State Grounds doctrine in Michigan v.
Long,3 27 holding that it will presume a state court judgment does not
rest upon adequate and independent state grounds unless the state
court opinion clearly says so.328 But although Long narrowed the
scope of the doctrine, the Court continued to insist that the
"avoidance of rendering advisory opinions" is one of the
"cornerstones" of the State Grounds doctrine.329 The Court also
stated that the doctrine "is based, in part, on 'the limitations of our
own jurisdiction,' " and it repeated the language from Herb v. Pitcairn
quoted above.330
A more fundamental problem with the Matasar and Bruch
analysis is that the existence of a concrete dispute by itself does not
necessarily satisfy the requirements of justiciability. One of the goals
behind the ban on advisory opinions-as well as the related doctrines
of standing, ripeness, and mootness-is to ensure that courts decide
legal issues only under circumstances that are likely to lead to well-
informed, thoughtful decisions.331 The existence of a concrete dispute
is thought to further this goal because it helps to focus the court's
possible anchor for the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine-the
constitutional ban against advisory opinions.").
323. 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
324. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
325. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
326. Id. at 126; see Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 522-24 (1997) (noting that
application of the State Grounds doctrine to federal habeas cases is "based upon equitable
considerations of federalism and comity"); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-31
(1991).
327. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
328. Id. at 1040-42.
329. See id. at 1040.
330. See id. at 1041-42.
331. See Dorf, supra note 257, at 2001 n.17; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article Ill's
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 447, 453-57 (1994).
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deliberation and provide real-world context for abstract legal
questions.332 But another reason for insisting upon a concrete dispute
is that it ensures the vigorous presentation of opposing viewpoints by
adverse parties.333 In other words, we want parties on each side with a
stake in the outcome of the dispute presenting their strongest
arguments to the court. This not only leads to more informed
decision-making by the courts, but also promotes fairness by ensuring
that the outcome of a legal question that will affect many parties is
not in the hands of a party lacking a stake in the outcome.334
A critical question, therefore, is whether the existence of a
concrete dispute in a particular context will provide the parties with
adequate incentives to argue vigorously the constitutional issue. In
harmless error and Fourth Amendment good faith cases, as in cases
under the State Grounds doctrine, the answer would seem to be yes.
The reason is that the parties do not know in advance which issue will
be dispositive. Although a court might decide that the alleged error
was harmless (or that the officer acted in good faith), it might decide
otherwise, making the constitutional issue dispositive. Therefore, in
order to protect themselves, the parties must argue both issues
vigorously.
But the same is not true in qualified immunity and habeas cases.
As demonstrated above, a ruling on the constitutional issue in these
cases can never change the outcome. In qualified immunity cases, if
the court rules that the constitutional right is clearly established, a
decision that the right exists is superfluous. And if the court rules
that the right is not clearly established, the case must be dismissed
regardless of whether the right exists.335 This suggests that the parties
in these cases lack incentives to argue vigorously the constitutional
issue.336 After all, if the constitutional issue cannot independently
332. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, § 2.1, at 46.
333. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968) (explaining the need for "a clash of
adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing
conflicting and demanding interests"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (noting that
standing requires "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions").
334. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 298 (1979).
335. The same analysis applies to habeas cases. If the court decides that the state court
decision was contrary to clearly established law, a decision that the state court decision
was wrong is superfluous. And if the court decides that the state court decision was not
contrary to clearly established law, the habeas petitioner loses regardless of whether the
state court decision was wrong.
336. See Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that "parties may
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affect the outcome of the case, why would the parties waste their time
on it?
For governmental litigants, the answer is fairly obvious.
Although a ruling on the constitutional issue may not affect the
outcome of the case at hand, it can affect the government's interests
in future cases. In qualified immunity cases, for instance, a ruling
today that a constitutional right exists means that tomorrow the right
will be clearly established such that qualified immunity will no longer
be a viable defense. As a repeat player, therefore, the government
has a strong incentive to oppose the recognition of constitutional
rights in most qualified immunity cases even though its immediate
liability turns solely on whether the right is clearly established.337 The
government has less at stake in habeas cases, since a ruling that the
state court incorrectly interpreted the Constitution can never form
the basis for a future habeas challenge unless issued by the Supreme
Court. But the government still has an incentive to contest the
constitutional issue vigorously, both because the ruling may be
viewed as persuasive authority in state courts and because the ruling
will be binding in federal courts, where state governments must still
litigate § 1983 cases.
For individual litigants, the incentives are less obvious. Unlike
the government, these litigants are not likely to find themselves back
in court in a case involving similar issues. And although they could
help future litigants by pressing constitutional issues vigorously,
qualified immunity plaintiffs and habeas petitioners are unlikely to
devise a litigation strategy with future litigants in mind. Even their
lawyers, who may take a broader view, have limited incentives to
argue the constitutional issue, since many of them work for a
contingency fee that is realized only if they defeat the qualified
immunity defense.338 What about the individual's interest in securing
do an inadequate job briefing and presenting an issue that predictably will have no effect
on the outcome of the case").
337. I say "most" cases because there may be some instances in which the conduct
complained of by the plaintiff is so unlikely to recur that the government has little reason
to argue against recognition of the constitutional right. See Coughlin, 191 F.3d at 247
(arguing that governmental defendants might not have adequate incentives to argue the
constitutional issue "where the challenged conduct occurs in a nonrecurring fact pattern,
so that the claimed right is not likely to be asserted again against the same defendant").
338. Ethical considerations may also limit the incentive of lawyers to litigate with
future cases in mind. The codes of ethical conduct direct lawyers to advocate zealously on
behalf of their clients, not on behalf of future clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Preamble (1983) (providing that "[a]s [an] advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts
the client's position under the rules of the adversary system"); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (1983) (providing that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable
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a judgment that his constitutional rights were violated? For the
habeas petitioner trying to get out of prison, such abstract vindication
seems like a small reward. For the qualified immunity plaintiff, even
this slight incentive is lacking. Because the issue of qualified
immunity is decided at the outset of a lawsuit,339 a ruling that the
constitutional right exists does not vindicate the plaintiffs claim. It
only establishes that his claim would be successful if he were able to
prove the facts alleged in his complaint.
A, more intriguing argument is that individual litigants have an
incentive to argue the constitutional issue because demonstrating that
the right exists is a necessary step in proving that the right is clearly
established. This argument has intuitive appeal. Lawyers and judges
often confront legal questions incrementally, starting with basic
propositions and working up to more complicated questions.
Moreover, a plaintiff who can satisfy the court that he is asserting the
violation of a constitutional right would seem to have a better chance
of demonstrating that the right is clearly established.
But the validity of this argument turns on how closely connected
the two questions are. In other words, does a court need to decide
whether the right exists in order to determine whether the right is
clearly established? As noted in Part I.B.1, the Court has suggested
that the answer is yes.34  In Siegert v. Gilley,341 Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote that "[a] necessary concomitant to the
determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a
plaintiff is clearly established at the time the defendant acted is the
determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a
constitutional right at all. '3 42 The Court did not explain why the latter
determination is a necessary concomitant to the former, however, and
a closer analysis strongly suggests that it is not.
Deciding whether a constitutional right is clearly established is
entirely a matter of analyzing precedent. A court identifies the date
on which the challenged action occurred and then searches case law
prior to that date to determine if the action violated "clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known. 3 43  Courts sometimes disagree about
which decisions to look to in determining whether a right is clearly
diligence ... in representing a client").
339. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
340. See supra Part I.B.1.
341. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
342. Id. at 232 (internal quotations omitted).
343. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
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established.3" But there is no dispute that what counts for purposes
of determining whether a constitutional right is clearly established is
case law.3 45 The same is true for habeas. Under AEDPA, the Court
has held that a constitutional right is "clearly established" for
purposes of habeas relief only if it is "dictated by precedent. 346
Deciding whether a constitutional right exists also involves an
analysis of case law. Under the common law tradition, which has
heavily influenced constitutional adjudication, legal principles
develop slowly, case by case, and courts typically look to prior cases
to determine whether a particular right exists.347 But although this is a
large part of constitutional adjudication, it is not the whole of it.
Courts interpreting the Constitution also look to other sources, such
as the text and structure of the document, the original understanding
of the framers, and the ethos of American democracy.348 Indeed,
344. For instance, courts debate whether they should look to decisions only within the
circuit or should also consider opinions from other circuits. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737
F.2d 1, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It is not clear, for example, how a court should determine
well-established rights: should our reference point be the opinions of the Supreme Court,
the Courts of Appeals, District Courts, the state courts, or all of the foregoing?");
Williamson v. City of Virginia Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238, 1261-62 (E.D. Va. 1992) ("In the
absence of controlling precedent in a jurisdiction establishing and defining the breadth of
a right, however, there are currently conflicting views as to whether 'non-controlling
precedents' (i.e. precedents from other jurisdictions), can 'clearly establish' a right for
qualified immunity purposes.").
345. See, e.g., Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating
"[t]he conduct occurred in 1995, and the law at that time must be our guide" and then
looking only at case law); Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1994) (evaluating
"whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and the applicable circuit court support
the existence of the right in question"); see also Richard B. Saphire, Qualified Immunity in
Section 1983 Cases and the Role of State Decisional Law, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 621, 622 (1993)
(noting the difficulties of determining whether the legal principles upon which the
plaintiff's cause of action rests were clearly established at the time the cause of action
arose); R. George Wright, Qualified and Civic Immunity in Section 1983 Actions: What
Do Justice and Efficiency Require?, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 18 (1998) (discussing the
puzzling question of "which courts count" in establishing the relevant law).
346. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000); see also Lambrix v. Singletary, 520
U.S. 518, 528 (1997) (stating that because the rule was not "dictated by precedent" it was
not clearly established for habeas purposes); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)
(stating, prior to AEDPA, that "a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated
by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final").
347. See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle,
112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1719 (2003) ("Much of American constitutional law consists of
precedents that have evolved in a common-law like way, with a life and logic of their
own."); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
225, 232 (1999) ("In its consistent practice since [Marbury], the Court has asserted, too,
that this final say is rooted in a common law framework. The Court does not come to the
interpretive question afresh each time it arises; its reading acquires the force of precedent
that itself binds future courts and actors until overruled.").
348. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806 (1995) (relying
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Philip Bobbitt identifies six types of arguments that lawyers and
judges have traditionally relied upon to support constitutional
claims.349 So although there is some overlap between deciding
whether a right exists and whether a right is clearly established, the
two determinations are not identical. Many factors that must be
considered in answering the former question are irrelevant in
answering the latter question.350 Moreover, a court does not need to
decide whether the right exists before deciding whether the right is
clearly established. It can make the latter determination without
engaging in the complex inquiry necessary for the former.
This analysis suggests that individual litigants in qualified
immunity and habeas cases may not have adequate incentives to
vigorously argue the constitutional issue. Although they will certainly
make doctrinal arguments that may bear on both the constitutional
issue and the clearly established issue, there is little reason for them
to make arguments based on constitutional text, structure, history or
other factors. As a result, the court's resolution of the constitutional
issue may not be adequately informed, which is what the ban on
advisory opinions is, in part, intended to assure.
One might respond that although this argument would have been
persuasive in the past, it no longer is. More than 210 years after the
founding, courts rarely find new constitutional rights based on
constitutional text, structure, or history. To do so would risk being
labeled activist. Instead, courts usually portray the recognition of
new rights as an inevitable outgrowth of prior decisions.35  And to the
extent that they are simply relying on precedent, the analysis of
upon "the text and structure of the Constitution, the relevant historical materials, and,
most importantly, the 'basic principles of our democratic system' "); Altman v. City of
High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 200-04 (4th Cir. 2003) (relying upon the text and early drafts of
the Fourth Amendment, as well as historical materials, to determine whether the right
asserted by the plaintiff exists); S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165,
179 (2001) ("The history, the text, and the structure of the Constitution confirm that under
its Article I powers, Congress cannot authorize private parties to hail unconsenting states
before the adjudicative apparatus of federal agencies and commissions.").
349. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
7, 93 (1982) (asserting that lawyers and judges make textual, structural, historical,
prudential, doctrinal, and ethical arguments to support constitutional claims).
350. At least one lower court seems to have recognized this. See Spivey v. Elliott, 41
F.3d 1497, 1499 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that "a determination of whether a right is clearly
established will always require no more, and will often require less, analysis than is
required to decide whether the allegedly violated constitutional right actually exists in the
first place").
351. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Prudence and Substance: How the Supreme Court's
New Habeas Retroactivity Doctrine Mirrors and Affects Substantive Constitutional Law, 30
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1992).
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whether a right exists may not differ much from an analysis of
whether a right is clearly established.
There is some truth to this argument. Modern constitutional
adjudication is quite removed from the Constitution itself, and it is
not unusual to read a Supreme Court opinion that focuses almost
exclusively on precedent. But to acknowledge this development is
not necessarily to embrace it. As Akhil Amar has argued recently, a
method of constitutional interpretation that focuses only on
precedent is often arid and sterile. 2 There are many instances in
which attention to the Constitution itself-to its "specific words and
word patterns, the historical experiences that birthed and rebirthed
the text, and the conceptual schemas and structures organizing the
document"353-offers insights and meaning that a narrow focus on
case law cannot. Thus, even if courts are likely to rely only on
precedent in determining whether a constitutional right exists, one
can object that this method of constitutional interpretation is
misguided and inadequate. Furthermore, to the extent that litigants
lack incentives to rely on anything other than precedent, allowing
courts to reach the underlying constitutional question in qualified
immunity and habeas cases seems certain to exacerbate the problem.
Finally, one might object that my analysis places too much
emphasis on the need for an adversarial presentation of constitutional
issues. After all, courts in civil law countries function perfectly well
without an adversarial system. In addition, many supporters of public
interest litigation have questioned the requirement of a plaintiff with
a personal stake, arguing that organizations with ideological agendas
can be equally effective as advocates. 4 But even supporters of public
interest litigation do not question the need for an adversarial
presentation of the issues.355  They question only the Court's
insistence that the presentation be made by parties with a personal
stake in the dispute. And although the civil law has survived without
an adversary system, we might still think decisions will be better
informed and more accurate if courts hear the best arguments from
parties on both sides of issues. Especially in constitutional
352. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 27 (2000).
353. Id. at 26.
354. See Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373,
375 n.13 (1974) ("The notion that a personal stake in the controversy is a good guide to a
litigant's capacity as an adversary has been persuasively criticized.").
355. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 71 (noting the importance of an
adversarial presentation of issues for a public rights approach to justiciability).
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adjudication, where the stakes are high and the decisions usually final,
an adversarial presentation of the issues seems essential.
2. Dicta and Alternative Holdings
If unnecessary constitutional rulings violate the ban on advisory
opinions because they have no effect on a dispute between the
parties, what should one conclude about dicta? These statements are
not necessary to support a court's decision and have no effect on the
outcome of a dispute,356 yet they are prevalent and generally
accepted. Do they also violate the ban on advisory opinions?
In answering this question, it is important to recognize that there
are several types of dicta. First, there are what Michael Dorf has
called "asides"-throwaway statements that judges know will not
have precedential weight, but that they hope will be persuasive." 7
For instance, a court might question a ruling made by a lower court
even though neither party has challenged the ruling on appeal. Such
statements do not have an effect on the outcome of the dispute and
therefore, under my analysis, would appear to violate the ban on
advisory opinions."' Yet there is a key difference between these
statements and unnecessary constitutional rulings in the areas
discussed above, which is that the former are not intended to be (and
are not treated as) binding precedent. Judges make many statements
both on and off the bench that are not necessary to resolving cases or
controversies. But the mere expression of an opinion by a judge does
not implicate Article III. Article III is implicated only when a judge
makes a statement that, by virtue of being treated as precedent, has
the force of law.359 For it is the lawmaking function of the courts that
the case or controversy requirement is intended to restrict.3 Non-
356. See Dorf, supra note 257, at 2000 (defining dicta as "statements in a judicial
opinion that are not necessary to support the decision reached by the court").
357. See id. at 2006.
358. See id. (noting that "in some sense a deliberate aside violates the rule against
advisory opinions," but suggesting that asides might be justifiable under some
circumstances).
359. By arguing that Article III is implicated only by statements that are treated as
precedent, I am implicitly accepting the view that the law of precedent-in particular the
distinction between holdings and dicta-is informed by, and perhaps required by, Article
III. For an argument that Article III is relevant to distinguishing between holdings and
dicta, see Dorf, supra note 257, at 2068 (stating that "a statute authorizing the federal
courts to give advisory opinions, and then to give precedential weight to those opinions,
would clearly violate the case-or-controversy requirement").
360. See Dorf, supra note 257, at 2001 ("The case-or-controversy requirement ensures
that federal courts will make law only insofar as they are competent to do so and that in
making law they do not usurp the proper role of another branch of government.").
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precedential statements of an advisory nature may be inappropriate
or imprudent. But they do not violate Article III.
Second, and closely related to the first type of dicta, are
statements that are not part of the rule announced by the court but
are made to support or explain the court's reasoning. For instance, a
court will sometimes construct and answer a hypothetical to
demonstrate the logical absurdity (or wisdom) of a particular line of
reasoning.36 When a court does this, it technically answers a question
of law that is not before the court and has no effect on the dispute
between the parties. But there are two reasons this type of dicta is
not particularly troubling. First, because the hypothetical is usually
designed to demonstrate the absurdity (or wisdom) of a particular
line of reasoning, the answer is almost always beyond dispute. That's
the point of the exercise: to identify a proposition everyone can agree
on and then demonstrate how that proposition conflicts (or is
consistent) with a particular line of reasoning. Second, like the first
category of dicta, these statements are not usually treated as
binding.362 Thus, even if they are advisory in nature, they do not
implicate Article III for the reasons given above.
The third category of dicta consists of those statements a court
makes that announce a "legal principle broader than the narrowest
proposition that can decide the case. '363  For instance, a court will
sometimes frame its ruling it broad terms when a narrow ruling
limited to the facts of the case would suffice. Chief Justice Rehnquist
has argued that Roe v. Wade3" contains this type of dicta. The Court
in Roe announced the broad principle that a woman has a
constitutional right to an abortion at least until viability.365 Rehnquist
361. In R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul, for instance, Justice Scalia's majority opinion stated
that the government could "prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently
offensive in its prurience," but could not prohibit "only that obscenity which includes
offensive political messages." 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (emphasis omitted). He also stated
that "the Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of violence that are
directed against the President," but "may not criminalize only those threats against the
President that mention his policy on aid to inner cities." Id. Although none of these
scenarios were before the Court, Scalia mentioned them to demonstrate the soundness of
his distinction between content discrimination generally and content discrimination based
on the very reasons that an entire class of speech is proscribable.
362. See Dorf, supra note 257, at 2057-58 & n.223 ("[S]ometimes a court will include
particular examples to illustrate a general point. If the particular examples are merely
illustrative, then when the same court faces a case in which a litigant seeks a result that is
consistent with the general principle but inconsistent with the specific examples, a decision
for that litigant would not be properly characterized as overruling the first case.").
363. See id. at 2007.
364. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
365. Id. at 164-65.
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claims that this announcement was not necessary to decide the case;
instead the Court only needed to rule that the Texas statute at issue
unconstitutionally infringed the right to an abortion derived from the
Due Process Clause.366 Therefore, Rehnquist argues, the Court's
announcement of a broad right to abortion was merely dicta.367
This category of dicta is more troubling than the first two
categories. When a court announces a broad rule of law to decide a
particular case, it effectively decides many cases at the same time.
For instance, in the abortion example, a ruling that women have a
constitutional right to abortion at least until viability not only
invalidated the Texas statute before the Court, but also invalidated
many other statutes across the country that differed in fundamental
ways from the Texas statute.36 Yet the Court did not consider each
of these statutes individually; instead it announced a broad rule of law
that swept them all away at the same time.
Although potentially troubling, there are several reasons why
this type of dicta may not violate the ban on advisory opinions. First,
unless a court simply repeats the facts of a case and announces a
judgment, its decision will almost always resolve other cases not
before the court. Any articulation of a general principle or rationale
will have implications beyond the case at hand; that is what it means
for a principle to be general.369 Yet most of us do not object to the
articulation of general principles by courts. To the contrary, we
believe that reliance on general principles promotes the rule of law
and prevents judges from deciding cases based on personal bias.3 71 So
to a certain extent, the announcement of legal principles broader than
necessary to decide a case is an inherent aspect of our legal system.
Of course, some opinions are broader than others, and one might
argue that even if all opinions inevitably have implications for cases
not before the court, that does not justify opinions that are
unnecessarily broad. Such opinions do not provide merely a rationale
366. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989).
367. See id.
368. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185,
1199 (1992) (noting that Roe announced a principle on abortion "that displaced virtually
every state law then in force").
369. See Dorf, supra note 257, at 1998 ("To say that the reasoning in a prior case
supports or even requires the same or similar result in a later case is to recognize that the
first case does not merely resolve a dispute between the parties but announces a general
principle applicable in future cases as well.").
370. See id. at 1997-98 (stating that "the precept that like cases should be treated
alike-rooted both in the rule of law and in Article III's invocation of the 'judicial
Power'-rests upon the assumption that judicial decisions are necessarily abstract or
general" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1)).
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for the decision that necessarily has broader application; instead they
go beyond the statement of a general principle to establish what
amounts to a legislative rule. Roe's creation of the trimester
framework has been criticized along these lines. 371  And when an
opinion sweeps this broadly, one might argue, the ban on advisory
opinions has certainly been violated.
I agree with this argument in general. Some opinions sweep so
broadly that one is hard pressed to deny their advisory character. But
I want to offer two caveats that may distinguish even these opinions
from unnecessary constitutional rulings in the areas under
consideration here. First, although we might all agree that opinions
are sometimes unnecessarily broad, we will frequently disagree about
whether a particular opinion is too broad. One person's advisory
opinion is often another person's idea of judicial restraint. As a
result, it is much harder to identify-and thus condemn-advisory
opinions of this type than those I have described in this Article.
Second, courts do not issue uniformly unnecessarily broad opinions.
They do so only in isolated cases and thus can consider whether the
unnecessary aspect of the opinion undermines the goals behind the
ban on advisory opinions. For instance, a court may determine in a
given case that the parties have argued an issue vigorously enough
that it has sufficient information to decide the issue even though
doing so is not strictly necessary. In qualified immunity cases,
however, the courts have no such discretion. The Supreme Court has
said they must decide the constitutional issue before deciding the
qualified immunity issue. And this instruction applies regardless of
whether there has been an adversarial presentation of the issue.
Finally, what are the implications of my analysis for alternative
holdings? Courts occasionally provide alternative holdings to support
their judgment, even though either holding on its own would be
sufficient to resolve the case.372 For instance, suppose a plaintiff
371. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 518 (arguing that Roe's trimester framework has resulted
in a "web of legal rules ... resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of
constitutional doctrine"); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 99
(1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the trimester
framework turned the Court into the nation's "ex officio medical board with powers to
approve or disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout the
United States"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The
decision here to break pregnancy into three distinct terms ... partakes more of judicial
legislation than it does of a determination of the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
372. See, e.g., SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 2002)
(holding that defendant's purchase and leaseback arrangement was not an "investment
contract" under federal law because there was no common enterprise, and in the
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challenges an agency regulation on grounds that it violates both the
Constitution and the agency's authorizing statute. In deciding the
case, a court might first rule that the regulation violates the
authorizing statute. Then, it might rule that even if the regulation
does not violate the statute, it violates the Constitution.3 73 Because
the latter holding is sufficient to resolve the case, the statutory ruling
is technically unnecessary and has no effect on the outcome of the
dispute. Yet alternative holdings are prevalent and widely
accepted.374  So what distinguishes these from unnecessary
constitutional rulings in qualified immunity, habeas corpus, harmless
error, and Fourth Amendment good faith cases?
In truth, there is no difference between alternative holdings and
unnecessary constitutional rulings in harmless error and Fourth
Amendment good faith cases. In both situations, the parties do not
know ahead of time which issue the court will rely on to support its
judgment. As a result, they must argue both issues fully in order to
protect their interests. That is the main reason unnecessary
constitutional rulings in harmless error and Fourth Amendment good
faith cases do not violate the ban on advisory opinions-at least if one
accepts the Matasar and Bruch analysis and ignores the State
Grounds doctrine.375, But parties in qualified immunity and habeas
cases know that a ruling on the constitutional issue can never affect
the outcome of the dispute and thus lack adequate incentive to argue
fully the issue. For that reason, unnecessary constitutional rulings in
these two areas are distinguishable from alternative holdings
generally.
Before closing my discussion of advisory opinions, there is one
other point I should consider. Perhaps I have approached the issue
from the wrong direction. Instead of arguing that unnecessary
constitutional rulings in some contexts violate the ban on advisory
opinions, perhaps I should argue that these rulings should not be
given precedential effect. After all, I maintain above that certain
types of dictum do not violate Article III because they are not
intended to carry precedential weight. Thus, if unnecessary
constitutional rulings were stripped of precedential force, presumably
they would not violate Article III either.
alternative investors did not expect profits to be derived solely through the efforts of
others).
373. This example is borrowed from Dorf, supra note 257, at 2006.
374. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 81 (stating that "settled practice"
suggests alternative holdings are constitutional).
375. See supra Part II.C.1.
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The problem with this solution is that it would seem to defeat
one of the main reasons for issuing unnecessary constitutional rulings.
As explained in Part I.B.1, at least several members of the Court
favor reaching the constitutional issues in qualified immunity cases
because they hope to establish clearly rights that can be relied upon
by later litigants. In addition, it seems likely that the Court's embrace
of unnecessary constitutional rulings in habeas cases is motivated by a
desire to establish rules of criminal procedure that will bind state
courts. Yet if these rulings are stripped of precedential effect, neither
of these goals will be met. The Court has interpreted the phrase
"clearly established Federal Law" in AEDPA to refer to "the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta," of the Supreme Court's
decisions.376 Thus, if the Court's rulings on the constitutional issues in
habeas cases are treated as dicta, they cannot serve as a basis for
habeas relief and will not bind state courts. The Court has not
explicitly addressed whether dicta can clearly establish rights for
purposes of qualified immunity, but, as lower court decisions
acknowledge, it would seem odd to conclude that they can.377
Qualified immunity is intended to prevent government officials from
having to guess when they will be held liable. Yet if we allow
qualified immunity to be defeated on the basis of judicial statements
that courts are free to ignore in ruling on the merits of a plaintiff's
claim, much of that guesswork will continue.
What this means, I think, is that we must evaluate unnecessary
constitutional rulings in qualified immunity and habeas cases on the
terms on which the Court has presented them-as judicial opinions
intended to carry the force of precedent. And on those terms, I have
tried to show, these rulings fail the test of Article III.
D. Summary
Unnecessary constitutional rulings in qualified immunity and
habeas cases violate the ban on advisory opinions because a decision
on the constitutional issue has no effect on the outcome of the
dispute. This lack of effect is troubling by itself: a court might not
give proper consideration to the constitutional issue if it knows that
neither party will be affected by its decision. But even if we presume
that courts will take seriously their responsibility to decide the issue,
376. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). AEDPA is discussed supra Part
II.B.2.
377. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Cannon, 80 F.3d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1996) ("The law
cannot be established by dicta. Dicta is particularly unhelpful in qualified immunity cases
where we seek to identify clearly established law.").
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the individual litigants in these cases lack adequate incentive to argue
the issue vigorously. Because they know that a decision on the
constitutional issue can never have any effect-and because deciding
the constitutional issue is not a necessary step to deciding the clearly
established issue-these litigants have little reason to make non-
precedent-based arguments that are vital to resolution of the
constitutional question.
Unnecessary constitutional rulings in harmless error and Fourth
Amendment good faith cases are less problematic because even
though these rulings often have no effect, the parties will not know
which issue is dispositive until after the decision is released.378 As a
result, the parties must vigorously argue both the constitutional issue
and the non-constitutional issue in order to protect themselves. In
this way, these two areas resemble the State Grounds doctrine, where
the parties do not know whether the federal issue will be decided
until after the Court determines whether there is an adequate and
independent state ground. It is true that the Court has described the
State Grounds doctrine as required by Article III, which would
suggest that unnecessary constitutional rulings in harmless error and
Fourth Amendment good faith cases violate the ban on advisory
opinions. But as Matasar and Bruch have shown, deciding the federal
issue in State Grounds cases does not undermine the goals served by
the ban on advisory opinions. Unnecessary constitutional rulings in
harmless error and Fourth Amendment good faith cases do not
undermine those goals either. Therefore, one can make a strong
argument that they do not violate the ban on advisory opinions.
III. UNNECESSARY CONSTITUTIONAL RULINGS AND THE
EVOLUTION OF NEW RIGHTS
Even if the Court's approach to unnecessary constitutional
rulings is permissible under Article III, we might still question
whether it is good policy. The principle of avoiding constitutional
questions has a long and distinguished pedigree and serves many
valuable functions. In this Part, I explore the foundations of that
principle and the ways it has manifested itself over the past two
centuries. I then consider whether, in light of this tradition, the
Court's willingness to issue unnecessary constitutional rulings can be
justified. The most intriguing justification is that the Court's
approach ensures the continued evolution of constitutional rights 79
378. See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
379. See Greabe, supra note 36, at 433-34.
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By reaching constitutional issues even in cases where a non-
constitutional issue is dispositive, courts are able to articulate new
constitutional rights that will benefit later litigants. Although I agree
that this is a powerful justification, it overlooks an important
consideration. When a court reaches out to decide the constitutional
issue in qualified immunity, habeas, harmless error, or Fourth
Amendment good faith cases, it will not necessarily rule that the right
exists. As I show below, more often than not courts decide that the
constitutional right does not exist. One might argue that this is
irrelevant in qualified immunity and habeas cases because a ruling
that a right does not exist leaves future litigants no worse off than a
ruling that the right is not clearly established; either way, they will be
denied relief. But such rulings do have collateral effects that might
make one question whether unnecessary constitutional rulings in
these areas are desirable.
A. The Passive Virtues
The principle of avoiding constitutional questions is nearly as old
as the ban on advisory opinions. As early as 1833, John Marshall
wrote that "the constitutionality of a legislative act" should only be
determined if doing so is "indispensably necessary to the case ...
[B]ut if the case may be determined on other points, a just respect for
the legislature requires[] that the obligation of its laws should not be
unnecessarily and wantonly assailed.""38  The Supreme Court
reiterated this principle in various cases over the next century,3"' but it
was not until the 1936 case of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority38 that the principle was fully elaborated. In a concurring
opinion in Ashwander, Justice Brandeis objected to the majority's
resolution of a constitutional question concerning the Wilson Dam.383
Citing "the practice in constitutional cases," Brandeis listed a series of
rules under which the Court "has avoided passing upon a large part of
380. Ex Parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558); see also
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 441 (1821) (stating that if the Court disposes of
the case on statutory grounds, "it will be unnecessary, and consequently improper" to
decide the constitutional issue).
381. See Matthew Addy Co. v. United States., 264 U.S. 239, 245 (1924); Howat v. State
of Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 184 (1922); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919);
United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909);
Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Emigration Comm'rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) ("[N]ever
... anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it
382. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
383. Id. at 341 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
[Vol. 83
2005] UNNECESSARY CONSTITUTIONAL RULINGS 923
all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision:
38
(1) "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding.... .
(2) "The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it."
(3) "The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied."
(4) "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is ... some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."
(5) "The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation."
(6) "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits."
(7) "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the question may be avoided. '385
Some of these rules have been incorporated into the Court's
jurisdictional doctrines.3 86 For instance, the first rule, which prevents
collusive suits, is reflected in the ban on advisory opinions and also in
standing doctrine, which requires a concrete dispute between adverse
litigants.387 The second rule, which prevents courts from deciding
constitutional questions prematurely, is reflected in the doctrine of
388 tripeness. And the fifth rule, which requires plaintiffs to show an
384. Id. at 345-46.
385. Id. at 346-48.
386. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV.
1003, 1018-23 (1994) (discussing the application of Brandeis's "rules" to Article III court
jurisdictional requirements).
387. See id. at 1018.
388. Id. at 1019 ("The second rule of the avoidance doctrine mirrors the ripeness
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injury, finds expression in the first prong of standing doctrine.389
Other rules, such as the mandate to formulate constitutional rules
narrowly and to construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional
questions, are not so much formal doctrines as prudential
considerations that courts rely upon at their discretion.3 9°
Brandeis and subsequent writers have offered several
justifications to support the avoidance principle.391  First, they have
pointed to the "great gravity and delicacy" of judicial review.392
Because federal judges are appointed and can only be removed
through impeachment, their review of legislative and executive
actions undermines the democratic process. As a result of this
"countermajoritarian difficulty, 3 93 some argue, courts should avoid
striking down laws and executive actions under the Constitution
whenever possible. At the same time, because judicial decisions
upholding governmental conduct may lend unwarranted legitimacy to
that conduct, courts should also refrain from unnecessarily declaring
the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions.394
Second, and closely related to the first justification, is the
preservation of the courts' credibility and legitimacy.3 95 Because
requirement in that it obliges federal courts to refrain from deciding a dispute
prematurely.").
389. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (articulating the first prong of the
standing doctrine: that the plaintiff's injury be concrete). The other two prongs of
jurisdictional standing are causation and redressability. See id.
390. See Pushaw, supra note 331, at 451 n.23.
391. See Kloppenberg, supra note 386, at 1012-23 (summarizing the arguments in
support of the avoidance principle).
392. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 224 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("In recognition of our place in the constitutional scheme, we must act with 'great gravity
and delicacy' when telling a coordinate branch that its actions are absolutely prohibited
absent constitutional amendment." (citation omitted)); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
(1962) (noting the delicacy of constitutional interpretation in the context of determining
what powers the constitution committed to the separate branches of government); Adkins
v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923) ("The judicial duty of passing upon
the constitutionality of an act of Congress is one of great gravity and delicacy.").
393. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 50, at 16.
394. See Bickel, supra note 9, at 48 ("To declare that a statute is not intolerable
because it is not inconsistent with principle amounts to a significant intervention in the
political process, different in degree only from a declaration of unconstitutionality."); see
also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243-48 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's acceptance of the Japanese internment was more dangerous than
the actual internment because the principle announced by the Court will survive, while the
internment would end after the war).
395. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, § 2.1, at 46 (noting some commentators'
argument that "federal courts generally depend on the other branches to voluntarily
comply with judicial orders and that such acquiescence depends on the judiciary's
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federal judges are not elected, they derive their legitimacy from the
people's acceptance of their decisions. One way to encourage this
acceptance is by issuing well-reasoned decisions based on principle,
not politics. But even then, courts still risk losing their credibility,
especially when they clash with elected officials. Therefore, in order
to maintain their legitimacy and credibility, courts should exercise
judicial review only when absolutely necessary. 96
Third, constitutional interpretation is an imprecise and difficult
task. The Constitution contains only the "great outlines" and
"important objects" of our government.3 97 The details must be
deduced from those outlines and objects, and there is widespread
disagreement about how that deduction should take place.3 98 Should
courts look only to the words of the Constitution or also to the intent
behind the words? If the latter, whose intent should count? The
intent of the framers? Those who ratified the Constitution? Or
should courts look beyond original intent and consider what the
words of the Constitution mean today, in view of our experience and
contemporary values? These are difficult questions, and even those
who agree on the proper method of constitutional interpretation
often disagree on the answers to particular constitutional questions.
In light of this disagreement and given the "fallibility of the human
judgment," courts should "shrink from exercising [judicial review] in
any case where [they] can conscientiously and with due regard to duty
and official oath decline the responsibility. 399
Finally, constitutional rulings are final in a way that other rulings
are not. When the courts misinterpret a statute or administrative
regulation, Congress or the executive branch can correct the error by
passing a new law or regulation. But when the courts issue a
constitutional ruling that the bther branches disagree with, their only
credibility"); Kloppenberg, supra note 386, at 1042 ("Proponents of avoidance techniques
... believe that the federal judiciary must exercise its powers cautiously to conserve the
fragile credibility of the least dangerous branch.").
396. See Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 572 n.38 (1947) ("It is not without
significance for the [avoidance] policy's validity that the periods when the power [of
judicial review] has been exercised most readily and broadly have been the ones in which
this Court and the institution of judicial review have had their stormiest experiences.").
397. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
398. For a general sense of this disagreement, compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (arguing for an
originalist, strict construction approach), with LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C.
DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991) (arguing for a broader, more interpretive
approach).
399. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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recourse is to introduce a constitutional amendment, which must be
approved by three fourths of the states.4" The amendment process is
notoriously difficult; in the 213 years since the Bill of Rights was
added to the Constitution, only seventeen amendments have been
ratified. Thus, given the likelihood that constitutional rulings will be
permanent, courts should avoid those rulings whenever possible.
Not all judges and scholars accept these justifications. Some
argue that countermajoritarian rulings do not pose a difficulty at all,
but are instead a necessary means of protecting minority rights in a
democracy.4 1  Others argue that the courts' concern with their
credibility is not a sufficient reason for avoiding constitutional
questions, and that this concern is overstated in any event.40 Even
after Bush v. Gore," a highly controversial decision with strong
political overtones, a large majority of Americans still have a
favorable impression of the Supreme Court.4" Finally, some argue
that constitutional rulings are not truly final because the political
branches are often able to circumvent court rulings.405 For instance,
after the Court ruled that the Gun Free School Zones Act exceeded
Congress's power under the commerce clause,4 6 Congress simply
amended the law prohibiting possession of firearms near school
campuses to apply only to the possession of firearms that have moved
in or otherwise affect interstate commerce.4 7 Congress could also
sidestep other recent Court decisions by repackaging Commerce
400. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the amendment process).
401. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III. Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L REV. 297, 310 (1979) ("One reason ... for
allowing courts to review legislation is that minority groups and unpopular points of view
may not be adequately represented in the processes of democratic decisionmaking.").
402. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 134-39 (1987)
(arguing that the Court's credibility is not fragile and that the Court's legitimacy should
not be a primary concern when interpreting the Constitution).
403. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
404. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court Has Become More
Politicized, Gallup News Service, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010103b.asp
(Jan. 3, 2001) (indicating that after the 2000 election, overall perception of the Court had
not changed, although opinion among Democrats and Republicans had become more
politicized) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Herbert M. Kritzer,
The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court,
85 JUDICATURE 32, 35 (2001) (same); Michael C. Dorf, The 2000 Presidential Election:
Archetype or Exception?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1279, 1296 n.70 (2001) (book review) (citing
Gallup poll data).
405. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 644-52
(1993) (offering as an example the legislative response to Roe v. Wade).
406. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
407. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000).
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Clause legislation as an exercise of its spending power.4 8
These are valid criticisms of the avoidance principle. But
although they call into question the foundations of that principle, they
do not undermine those foundations altogether. The exercise of
judicial review may be necessary to protect minority rights in a
democracy, but that does not make it any less objectionable to the
majority. Likewise, although the courts' legitimacy may not have
suffered from Bush v. Gore, there is little doubt that a court actively
bent on thwarting the will of the political branches would soon find
itself under fire.409 And while the political branches sometimes are
able to circumvent judicial decisions, constitutional rulings often
foreclose political resolution of the country's most difficult
problems.41 Thus, even if absolute adherence to the avoidance
principle cannot be justified, there are good reasons to apply a
presumption against unnecessary constitutional rulings. 11 Moreover,
any departure from the avoidance principle should be supported by
equally good reasons. In the next Section, I consider what reasons
might support a departure from the avoidance principle in the four
areas under discussion.
B. The Active Virtues
As noted in Part I.B, the Court has not attempted to justify its
approval of unnecessary constitutional rulings in harmless
constitutional error and habeas cases. Even in those areas in which
the Court has offered justifications, its reasoning has been flawed.
For instance, Justice Rehnquist's claim that courts must decide the
constitutional issue in qualified immunity cases to "expeditiously
408. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It
To Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 499-503 (2003) (explaining how Congress can use its
conditional spending power to "effectively overturn Supreme Court decisions that have
restricted congressional power."); Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending
Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 33 (2003) ("Congress's
essentially unquestioned power to spend money, with regulatory strings attached,
continues to provide practically limitless opportunities for the national government
indirectly to shape policy at the state and local levels of society and government.").
409. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW
DEAL: 1932-1940,231-38 (1963); Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA.
L. REV. 201 (1994) (detailing the story of Roosevelt's Court-packing controversy).
410. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 50, at 147 ("[T]he
'tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function [of judicial review] ... is to
dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral
responsibility.' " (quoting J.B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901))).
411. Even critics of the avoidance principle support a less rigid version of it, not its
complete elimination. See Kloppenberg, supra note 386, at 1065.
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weed out" meritless suits makes no sense given that qualified
immunity already serves that function. Justice Rehnquist is also
mistaken to claim that deciding the constitutional issue is a "necessary
concomitant" to deciding the qualified immunity question. As
explained in Part II.C.1, a court does not need to address the former
question to answer the latter.412
But some scholars have offered a justification for the Court's
approach in qualified immunity cases that is worth taking seriously.
They argue that reaching the constitutional issue in these cases helps
to ensure the continued development of constitutional rights. If
courts avoid constitutional issues whenever a case can be resolved on
non-constitutional grounds, they argue, the body of recognized
constitutional rights will stagnate. 13 Moreover, in an area such as
qualified immunity, where relief can only be granted for the violation
of clearly established rights, avoiding the constitutional issue creates a
Catch-22 for plaintiffs.414  They are denied relief because the
constitutional rights they assert are not clearly established. But it is
difficult for the constitutional rights to become clearly established
because the courts always skip the constitutional issues. 415 Allowing
the courts to reach constitutional questions helps break this cycle and
ensures that constitutional rights continue to evolve.
Scholars who make this argument are appealing primarily to
those who support the expansion of constitutional rights. For those
who think constitutional meaning is fixed and that the recognition of
new rights is illegitimate, this argument will likely be unpersuasive.
But even if one accepts the premise that constitutional evolution is a
good thing, one might still question the wisdom of allowing courts to
issue unnecessary constitutional rulings. The reason is that when
courts reach out to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily, they
do not always reach decisions that expand the universe of recognized
rights. Just as often, they use the opportunity to contain the body of
recognized rights and to deny the existence of new rights.
The Rehnquist Court is a good example. In each of the three
qualified immunity cases in which the Court has decided the
412. See supra notes 340-50 and accompanying text.
413. See Greabe, supra note 36, at 410 ("The requirement that the allegedly violated
right be clearly established at the time of the action in question tends, if not to 'freeze'
constitutional law, then at least to retard its growth .... ").
414. See Greabe, supra note 36, at 405 ("[T]he corpus of constitutional law grows only
when courts address and resolve novel constitutional claims, but courts often cannot order
a remedy for such claims because of their novelty.").
415. It is difficult, but not impossible, because the constitutional rights can become
established in criminal cases and in civil rights suits for injunctive relief.
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constitutional issue, it has denied the existence of the constitutional
right asserted by the plaintiff.416 The Court has also reached out to
deny the existence of constitutional rights in other areas. In Michigan
v. Long, for instance, the Court modified the State Grounds doctrine,
holding that it will presume a state court decision does not rest upon
adequate and independent state grounds unless the state court
decision clearly says so.417 The result of this decision is to expand the
Supreme Court's review of state court decisions on issues of federal
law-presumably a positive development for the protection of
constitutional rights. But the Court has used its expanded jurisdiction
not to reverse state court decisions denying constitutional claims, but
to reverse those decisions accepting constitutional claims.418 In other
words, the Supreme Court has used its valuable resources to reverse
state court judges who have been overly protective of federal rights.
As Justice Stevens has pointed out, this is a bizarre turn of events.419
The framers favored federal court review of state court decisions out
of fear that state judges would be biased against federal rights, not
out of concern that they would be too protective of federal rights.4 °
The track record of the Rehnquist Court highlights an interesting
and often overlooked point about judicial activism. People who came
of age during or after the Warren Court era tend to associate judicial
activism with liberal causes. Indeed, political rhetoric has firmly
linked the two ideas, so that whenever a politician uses the term
"activist judge," the word liberal is sure to follow.4"1 But there is
416. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207-09 (2001); County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 853-55 (1998); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1991).
417. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-42 (1983).
418. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 553-54 (1987); see also Colorado v.
Nunez, 465 U.S. 324 (1984) (White, J., concurring) (agreeing that the Court lacked
jurisdiction under the State Grounds doctrine, but proceeding to argue that the state court
wrongly decided the federal issue); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042-43 (1983)
(reversing state court's decision that search of the passenger compartment of defendant's
car violated the Fourth Amendment); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562--64
(1983) (reversing a state court decision holding that admitting a defendant's refusal to take
a blood-alcohol test into evidence violated the Fifth Amendment).
419. See Michigan, 463 U.S. at 1067-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
should not depart from the avoidance principle in cases "in which a state court has upheld
a citizen's assertion of a right").
420. Indeed, the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts jurisdiction to review only
those state court judgments denying federal claims. It was not until 1914 that Congress
gave the courts jurisdiction to review state court decisions upholding federal claims. See
Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000)).
421. See The 2000 Campaign: A Presidential Debate: Transcript of Debate Between
Vice President Gore and Governor Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at A30 (Bush: "I'll tell
you what kind of judges he'll put on there. He'll put liberal, activist judges who will use
their bench to subvert the legislature, that's what he'll do."); Edward Walsh, DNC's TV
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nothing uniquely liberal about judicial activism, as the history of the
Lochner Court attests.422 Judicial activism can be used to achieve
whatever ends are desired by those who engage in it. Thus, liberals
who support the continued evolution of constitutional rights should
think twice before endorsing a policy of judicial activism initiated by a
very non-liberal Court.
Even in the lower courts, there is reason to worry about the
consequences of the Court's new activism. I reviewed all circuit court
cases in the two years after Saucier v. Katz that cited that opinion's
instructions on the proper order of decision-making in qualified
immunity cases. As the Appendix shows, of ninety-two asserted
rights that were not clearly established, the courts held that seventy
were not protected by the Constitution at all. To put the point
another way, in seventy-six percent of the cases in which the appellate
courts reached out to decide the constitutional issue even though the
defendant had qualified immunity, they ruled against the plaintiff
asserting the existence of the constitutional right. Only in seventeen
percent of cases did the appellate courts rule that the asserted right,
even though not clearly established, was nonetheless protected by the
Constitution.423
These findings raise serious questions about the extent to which
the Court's departure from the avoidance principle actually promotes
the evolution of constitutional rights. Not only is it unusual for courts
to establish the existence of a new right, but more often than not they
rule that the asserted right does not exist. One might argue that this
is irrelevant to civil rights plaintiffs. After all, if a court concludes
that a right does not exist, it necessarily believes that the right is not
clearly established. And because plaintiffs cannot defeat qualified
immunity unless the asserted right is clearly established, what do they
lose when a court goes one step further and declares that the right
does not exist? Their complaints would have failed in any event.
The answer is that although the rejection of a constitutional right
makes no difference for civil rights plaintiffs seeking money damages,
Ad Targets Bush Record in Texas, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2000, at A8 (quoting Dan
Bartlett, a Bush campaign spokesman, calling a Democratic ad a "distortion" of Bush's
record based on the opinion of a "liberal, activist judge").
422. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 44-49, 168-89 (1990) (describing Lochner as conservative judicial activism);
Peter M. Shane, Federalism's 'Old Deal': What's Right and Wrong with Conservative
Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 206 (2000).
423. In the remaining seven percent of cases, the courts departed from Saucier's
instructions and did not explicitly decide whether the right asserted by the plaintiff is
protected by the Constitution.
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it does disadvantage civil rights plaintiffs seeking equitable relief.
Qualified immunity is only a defense to monetary liability; it does not
protect government officials from actions seeking an injunction or a
declaratory judgment.4124 Therefore, when a court rules that an
asserted right does not exist, it precludes future plaintiffs from
asserting that right as a basis for equitable relief. It also precludes
criminal defendants from relying on the right. In areas such as the
Fourth Amendment, criminal defendants assert many of the same
rights as civil rights plaintiffs.425 And like plaintiffs seeking equitable
relief, criminal defendants are entitled to relief as long as the right
exists, even if it is not clearly established. So when a court hearing a
qualified immunity case reaches out to deny the existence of a
constitutional right, it prevents future criminal defendants from
asserting that right in courts within the same jurisdiction. Even in
courts outside the jurisdiction, the ruling may be relied upon as
persuasive authority to reject similar rights asserted by criminal
defendants.
Of course, it is possible that later courts would agree that the
constitutional right does not exist, in which case the criminal
defendant and the plaintiff seeking equitable relief would lose in any
event. Formalists might even argue that later courts would inevitably
agree with the earlier determination since under a formalist
perspective rights are not contingent. But even a stubborn formalist
would be hard pressed to deny that whether a particular right is
deemed to exist-as opposed to whether it actually exists-depends
in large part on which court or judge makes the decision. The battles
waged over judicial nominations would seem to prove this point, as
would a comparison of rulings from the Ninth and Fourth Circuits.
So while it is possible that all courts would reach the same conclusion
about whether a particular right exists, legal realism teaches us not to
424. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 736 (1980);
Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996); Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 81 (2d
Cir. 1995).
425. For instance, a person arrested pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute can
challenge that arrest both as part of his criminal defense and as part of a civil rights suit.
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 551-52 (1967). Criminal defendants and civil rights
plaintiffs also make similar claims regarding unreasonable searches, arrests without
probable cause, and infringements on free speech. For instance, in Ealum v. Schirard, 46
Fed. Appx. 587, 590 (10th Cir. 2002), the plaintiffs filed a § 1983 suit alleging that officers
had conducted an unlawful search of their home after criminal charges against them had
been dismissed based on the same claim. Likewise, in Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1211
(9th Cir. 2001), a demonstrator who had been arrested during an abortion protest filed a
civil rights suit alleging a First Amendment violation that could also have been a defense
to his arrest for trespassing.
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bet on this outcome.
Still, it remains to be shown that delaying decisions on
constitutional issues will benefit criminal defendants and plaintiffs
seeking equitable relief. Many scholars argue that courts are more
likely to recognize constitutional rights when the costs of doing so are
minimized or delayed.426 For instance, it has long been thought that
the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution was made possible
largely by its embrace of non-retroactivity, which ensured that a
decision such as Miranda only applied prospectively and did not open
the prison gates.427 Building on these insights, John Jeffries argues
that courts are more likely to recognize new constitutional rights in
cases in which the defendant has qualified immunity-i.e. in cases
where the right is not clearly established-because the cost of doing
so is low.428 If this is correct, criminal defendants and plaintiffs
seeking equitable relief may not lose anything when a court reaches
out to deny the existence of a constitutional right in a qualified
immunity case. If the right is rejected in a case where the cost of
innovation is low, chances are slim that it would be accepted in a later
case where the cost of innovation is higher.
There are two objections to this argument, and it is worthwhile to
work through each one carefully. First, the cost of innovation in a
civil rights claim for equitable relief is no higher than in a money
damages action in which the defendant has qualified immunity. In
both situations, recognition of a new right will require government
officials only to alter their conduct in the future and will not penalize
them for past violations. The cost of recognizing new rights in
criminal cases may indeed be higher, since a guilty defendant could
possibly go free as a result. But the cost of rejecting the right is also
higher. When a court determines that the right asserted by a civil
rights plaintiff is not clearly established, there are no consequences to
a decision that the right does not exist. The plaintiff has already lost
because the defendant has qualified immunity. In a criminal case,
426. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 87, 90 (1999) ("Put simply, limiting money damages for constitutional violations
fosters the development of constitutional law."); Kamin, supra note 36, at 9-55, 34
(arguing that the doctrines of harmless error, non-retroactivity, and qualified immunity
have "the capacity to either stifle the development of constitutional law-by allowing
courts to avoid difficult questions of constitutional law--or to further it-by allowing
courts to make broad changes in the law at a relatively low social cost").
427. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 8, at 1739.
428. See Jeffries, supra note 426, at 99-100 (arguing that qualified immunity "allows
courts to embrace innovation without the potentially paralyzing cost of full remediation
for past practice").
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however, the court's rejection of an asserted right has real
consequences for the defendant and may even result in a miscarriage
of justice. Thus, it may be wrong to assume that courts are more
likely to recognize constitutional rights in qualified immunity cases
than in criminal cases. For although the costs of innovation are
higher in the latter context, the costs of not innovating are also
higher.
Second, and more importantly, civil rights plaintiffs seeking
money damages may not have adequate incentives to argue that the
asserted right exists even if it is not clearly established. As I
explained in Part II.B, a decision on the constitutional issue in a
qualified immunity case can never affect the outcome of the case. If
the right is clearly established, it necessarily exists. And if the right is
not clearly established, the defendant has qualified immunity
regardless of whether the right exists. This means that a civil rights
plaintiff seeking money damages can never benefit from a separate
ruling that the asserted right exists. Criminal defendants and
equitable plaintiffs, by contrast, have much to gain from a ruling that
the right exists, since qualified immunity is not a defense in criminal
cases or equitable actions. Therefore, they are likely to be more
effective advocates for the recognition of new constitutional rights.
Aside from the consequences for criminal defendants and
equitable plaintiffs, there are other reasons to be concerned about
courts reaching out to deny the existence of constitutional rights. For
one thing, a ruling that a constitutional right does not exist may have
a domino effect. Courts interpreting the Constitution typically follow
the common law approach, building on principles laid down by earlier
decisions and other courts. Thus, when one court rejects a
constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff, others are likely to reject
similar rights in analogous cases. Considering that seventy asserted
rights were rejected by the circuit courts in a two-year span, this
domino effect could be significant.42 9
In addition, a ruling that a constitutional right does not exist
authorizes government officials to engage in conduct they otherwise
might have avoided. Although officials cannot be held liable in
money damages for infringing unestablished rights, even a novel right
can be the basis for excluding evidence in a criminal trial. Thus, as
long as it is unclear whether a particular right exists, officials have an
incentive to avoid conduct that might infringe on that right. Once a
court reaches out to rule that a right does not exist, however, the
429. See Appendix.
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government has no incentive to curb its conduct. It can infringe the
asserted right with impunity.
Some might welcome this development, believing that police and
other government officials have been unnecessarily shackled by
uncertainty about the scope of constitutional rights. But for those
who support the Court's approval of unnecessary constitutional
rulings out of a desire to promote civil liberties, this possibility should
be troubling. Government officials have long taken advantage of
uncertainty in the law to avoid liability in civil rights cases. But legal
uncertainty can also benefit the targets of police activity by deterring
conduct that, although technically legal, skirts the edge of the law.
My point is not to deny that civil rights plaintiffs might benefit
from allowing courts to decide constitutional questions in qualified
immunity and other cases. Clearly, plaintiffs in these cases are caught
in a Catch-22 that makes it difficult to ever overcome the obstacle of
qualified immunity. But like many solutions to difficult problems,
requiring courts to decide the constitutional questions in these cases
has unintended consequences that may outweigh any benefits gained
by civil rights plaintiffs. Especially in light of evidence that courts are
far more likely to deny the existence of new rights than to recognize
new rights, one might conclude that the benefits are not worth the
costs.
So what is the solution to the problem? If my analysis in Part II
is correct and deciding the constitutional issues in these cases violates
the ban on advisory opinions, there may be no solution. Plaintiffs
may simply have to hope that new rights will become clearly
established in criminal cases and in civil rights suits seeking injunctive
relief. But if I am wrong in Part II-or if I am right, but the Court
ignores the ban on advisory opinions-there is a relatively simple
solution. Instead of requiring lower courts to decide the
constitutional issues in all qualified immunity cases, the Supreme
Court should instead permit lower courts to decide constitutional
issues at their discretion. The lower courts should then exercise this
discretion only in those cases in which the constitutional issue is
adequately briefed and presented for decision. If the plaintiff is pro
se or fails to advocate vigorously for the existence of the
constitutional right, a court should decline to resolve the issue. But if
the court concludes that the parties have vigorously contested the
issue and that it has sufficient information to reach a thoughtful
decision, it can choose to decide whether the constitutional right
exists. This way, courts will continue to establish new rights, but will
not resolve constitutional issues without "that concrete adverseness
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which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. 4 30
CONCLUSION
The rise of unnecessary constitutional rulings is a troubling
development. The federal courts have long maintained that they will
avoid constitutional questions whenever possible. And although the
courts have not adhered to this promise in every case, they have
repeatedly invoked it as a guiding principle. But with its embrace of
unnecessary constitutional rulings in the four areas discussed above,
the Court has systematically departed from the avoidance principle.
Moreover, it has failed to acknowledge the extent of this departure or
its implications under Article III.
As I have argued above, the Court's authorization of
unnecessary constitutional rulings can be understood as part of larger
trend in which the Court has asserted its supremacy over the other
branches of government and has come to see its primary role as the
declaration of constitutional norms rather than the resolution of
ordinary disputes. But the Court's departure from avoidance is also
the result of specific pressures and developments in each of the areas
in which it has authorized unnecessary constitutional rulings. In
particular, this departure might be seen as an effort by the Court to
preserve opportunities for the federal courts to engage in
constitutional interpretation.
Whatever the explanation, unnecessary constitutional rulings
raise serious questions under Article III. Because these rulings have
no effect on the outcome of a dispute between adverse litigants, they
violate one of the principles underlying the ban on advisory opinions.
Moreover, courts deciding constitutional questions unnecessarily may
not have adequate information to reach thoughtful decisions. This is
especially true in qualified immunity and habeas corpus cases, where
a decision on the constitutional issue can never affect the outcome,
and individual litigants therefore lack incentives to argue the
constitutional issue vigorously. For this reason, I conclude that
unnecessary constitutional issues in these cases violate the ban on
advisory opinions.
Even apart from Article III, there are reasons to be concerned
about the Court's embrace of unnecessary constitutional rulings.
430. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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Although some scholars have welcomed these rulings in qualified
immunity cases as a way to ensure that new constitutional rights are
established, the Rehnquist Court has frequently used unnecessary
constitutional rulings to restrict, rather than expand, constitutional
rights. In addition, my review of qualified immunity cases in the
lower courts shows that courts are far more likely to deny the
existence of asserted rights than they are to accept them. The denial
of an asserted right may not leave a qualified immunity plaintiff or
habeas petitioner worse off. But it does disadvantage criminal
defendants and civil rights plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief, since
they are entitled to relief as long as the right exists, even if it is not
clearly established. The denial of asserted rights could also have a
domino effect and give police free rein to engage in conduct they
otherwise might have avoided.
The avoidance principle has served the federal courts well for
more than 200 years. It has helped to preserve their legitimacy and to
minimize conflicts between the unelected judiciary and the will of the
majority. Avoidance is not an absolute principle. There are times
when it makes sense for the courts to confront constitutional
questions head-on rather than dodge them indefinitely. But in the
absence of some compelling justification, federal courts should only
decide constitutional questions when doing so is necessary to fulfill
their duty of resolving cases.
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APPENDIX
The following table lists all circuit court cases decided in the two
years after Saucier v. Katz that cited that opinion's instructions on the
proper order of decision-making in qualified immunity cases.431 For
each case, the table shows the nature of the constitutional right
asserted, the court's decision as to whether the asserted right exists,
and the court's decision as to whether the asserted right was clearly
established at the time of the events giving rise to the lawsuit. Where
a court held that the asserted right does not exist, I have indicated
that the right is not clearly established-even if the court did not
actually reach that question, since a right. cannot be clearly
established if it does not exist. For cases in which the plaintiff
asserted multiple rights or the same right against multiple defendants,
I have listed each right, and the court's decision as to each right,
separately.
The table shows that of 167 rights asserted by plaintiffs, sixty
were clearly established and ninety-two were not clearly established.
(There was no decision on the other fifteen asserted rights.) Of the
ninety-two asserted rights not clearly established, 70-or seventy-six
percent-were held not to be protected by the Constitution at all,
while sixteen-or seventeen percent-were held to be
constitutionally protected. In the remaining seven percent of cases,
the courts did not explicitly decide whether the asserted right is
constitutionally protected.
Case Name Nature of Right Does the Is the Right
Asserted Right Clearly
Exist? Established?
Alkire v. Irving, 305 F.3d 456, 468 Unreasonable seizure Yes Yes
(6th Cir. 2002)
Altman v. City of High Point, 330 Unreasonable seizure No No
F.3d 194, 200-07 (4th Cir. 2003)
431. The list was compiled by conducting a Westlaw "citation reference" search on
Saucier v. Katz on Nov. 15, 2004. The search was limited to all circuit court cases decided
before June 19, 2003 that cited Westlaw headnote 5, which states that "a court required to
rule upon qualified immunity of a government official in a civil rights action must
consider, as its initial inquiry, whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable
to the party asserting the injury, show that the official's conduct violated a constitutional
right." Although it is possible that some courts have followed Saucier's instructions
without citing headnote 5, I believe this list is sufficiently complete for my purpose, which
is to determine roughly how often courts recognize the existence of an alleged
constitutional right.
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Case Name Nature of Right Does the Is the Right
Asserted Right Clearly
Exist? Established?
Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, (1) Cruel and unusual (1) Yes (1) Yes
264, 266-70 (3d Cir. 2003) punishment (2) Yes (2) Yes




Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204, (1) Cruel and unusual (1) No (1) No




Barney v. City of Eugene, 20 Fed. Free speech and No No
Appx. 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2001) assembly
(mem.)
Baskin v. Smith, 50 Fed. Appx. (1) Arrest without (1) Yes (1) Yes
731, 734-36 (6th Cir. 2002) probable cause (2) Yes (2) Yes
(2) Excessive force
Batten v. Gomez, 324 F.3d 288, (1) Illegal extradition (1) No (1) No
293 (4th Cir. 2003) (2) Due process (2) Yes (2) No
Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Arrest without No No
320 F.3d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 2003) probable cause
Bell v. Manspeaker, 34 Fed. Arrest without No No
Appx. 637,642 (10th Cir. 2002) probable cause
Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, Excessive force Yes Does not decide
137 (3d Cir. 2002)
Billings v. Madison Metropolitan (1) Equal protection (1) No (1) No
School District, 259 F.3d 807,815- (2) Equal protection (2) Yes (2) Yes
17 (7th Cir. 2001)
Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, Fourth Amendment No No
1191 (9th Cir. 2002) excessive force
Bingham v. City of Manhattan (1) Unreasonable (1) Yes (1) Yes
Beach, 329 F.3d 723, 729 (9th Cir. seizure (2) Yes (2) Yes
2003) (2) Wrongful arrest
Bleavins v. Bartels, 326 F.3d 887, Unreasonable seizure Does not Does not decide
891-92 (7th Cir. 2003) decide
Branton v. City of Dallas, 272 F.3 ree speech Yes Yes
730, 744 (5th Cir. 2001)
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Case Name Nature of Right Does the Is the Right
Asserted Right Clearly
Exist? Established?
Brees v. Courtesy Ford, Inc., 45 (1) Deliberate (1) No (1) No
Fed. Appx. 711, 714-17 (9th Cir. indifference to medical (2) Yes (2) Yes




Brewster v. Shasta County, 27 (1) Due process (1) Yes (1) Yes
Fed. Appx. 908, 911-14 (9th Cir. (2) Arrest without (2) Yes (2) Yes
2001) (mem.) probable cause
Briscoe-King v. Terhune, 43 Fed. Free speech Yes Yes
Appx. 45, 47 (9th Cir. 2002)
(mem.)
Butler v. Bayer, 63 Fed. Appx. Deliberate No No
298, 299 (9th Cir. 2003) (mem.) indifference to medica
needs/safety
Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d Unreasonable search Does not No
156, 160-68 (2d Cir. 2002) and seizure decide
Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, Cruel and unusual Yes No
700 (7th Cir. 2001) punishment
Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control (1) Wrongful arrest (1) Yes (1) Yes
Board, 279 F.3d 873,879-81 (9th (2) Unreasonable (2) Yes (2) Yes
Cir. 2002) earch
Caricofe v. Mayor and City Excessive force No No
Council of Ocean City, 32 Fed.
Appx. 62, 66 (4th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam)
Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, eliberate Yes Yes
622-23 (7th Cir. 2003) ndifference to suicide
risk
Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, xcessive force Yes Yes
553-54 (4th Cir. 2002)
Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, (1) Excessive force (1) No (1) No
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Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d (1) Deliberate (1) Yes (1) Yes
693, 702-04, 711-13 (6th Cir. indifference to medical (2) No (2) No




(3) Deliberateindifference to medical
needs
Crockett v. Cumberland College, Arrest without No No
316 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 2003) probable cause
Cruz v. Kauai County, 279 F.3d Unreasonable seizure Yes No
1064, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2002)
Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 279 Unreasonable seizure Yes Does not decide
(3d Cir. 2002)
Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, Unlawful arrest No No
1233 (11th Cir. 2002)
Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d Due process Does not Does not decide
1070, 1074-76 (9th Cir. 2001) decide
Dirrane v. Brookline Police Free speech Yes No
Department, 315 F.3d 65, 69-70
(1st Cir. 2002)
Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 511, (1) Unreasonable (1) Yes (1) No
516, 524-27 (7th Cir. 2003) seizure (2) Yes (2) No




Dreibel v. City of Milwaukee, 298 (1) Unreasonable (1) No (1) No
F.3d 622, 641-52 (7th Cir. 2002) seizure (2) No (2) No
(2) Unreasonable (3) No (3) No
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Ealum v. Schirard, 46 Fed. Appx. (1) Excessive force (1) Yes (1) Yes
587, 592-95 (10th Cir. 2002) (2) Unreasonable (2) Yes (2) Yes
search (3) No (3) No
(3) Excessive force
Estep v. Dallas County, 310 F.3d Unreasonable search Yes Yes
353, 358-61 (5th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam)
Farm Labor Organizing (1) Equal protection (1) Yes (1) Yes
Committee v. Ohio State Highway (2) Unreasonable (2) Yes (2) Yes
Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 532-49 (6th eizure
Cir. 2002)
Federman v. County of Kern, 61 (1) Excessive force (1) Yes (1) Yes
Fed. Appx. 438,440-42 (9th Cir. (2) Excessive force (2) Yes (2) Yes
2003) (mem.)
Fersner v. Prince George's Unreasonable seizure Does not Does not decide
County, Maryland, 22 Fed. Appx. decide
314, 315 (4th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam)
Finsel v. Cruppenink, 326 F.3d Unreasonable search Does not Yes
903, 906-07 (7th Cir. 2003) decide
Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Equal protection Does not Does not decide
School District, 18 Fed. Appx. decide
646, 647-48 (9th Cir. 2001) (mem.)
Forbes v. Township of Lower Excessive force Does not Does not decide
Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 148-50 (3d decide
Cir. 2002)
Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 437 Arrest without Does not No
(9th Cir. 2002) probable cause decide
Ganwich v. Knapp, 319 F.3d 1115, Unreasonable seizure Yes Yes
1119-24 (9th Cir. 2003)
Gardner v. Williams, 56 Fed. Arrest without Yes Yes
Appx. 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2003) probable cause
(per curiam)
Goad v. Mitchell, 297 F.3d 497, Free speech Does not Does not decide
505 (6th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) decide
Gomez v. Atkins, 296 F.3d 253, Arrest without Does not No
261-63 (4th Cir. 2002) probable cause decide
Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, Unreasonable seizure No 1o
1234 (11th Cir. 2003)
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Grant v. City of Long Beach, 315 Arrest without Yes Yes
F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2002) probable cause
Grauerholz v. Adcock, 51 Fed. Excessive force No No
Appx. 298, 300 (10th Cir. 2002)
Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, (1) Arrest without (1) Yes (1) Yes
897-99 (6th Cir. 2002) probable cause (2) Yes (2) No
(2) Excessive force
Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, Deliberate Does not Does not decide
786 (3d Cir. 2003) ndifference to safety decide
Hamilton v. Jackson, 59 Fed. Failure to provide Does not Does not decide
Appx. 222, 222 (9th Cir. 2003) medical treatment decide
(mem.)
Hart v. Myers, 50 Fed. Appx. 45, Unreasonable seizure Does not No
47 (2d Cir. 2002) decide
Headwaters Forest Defense v. Excessive force Yes Yes
County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d
1125, 1129-31 (9th Cir. 2002)
Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d (1) Unreasonable (1) No (1) No
1069, 1078-84 (11th Cir. 2003) search (2) Yes (2) Yes
(2) Unlawful arrest (3) Yes (3) Yes




Humphrey v. Lane County, 35 Unreasonable seizure Yes No
Fed. Appx. 538, 539 (9th Cir.
2002) (mem.)
Jarrett v. Town of Yarmouth, 331 Excessive force No No
F.3d 140, 146-50 (1st Cir. 2003)
(per curiam)
Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 Excessive force No No
F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001)
Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, Excessive force Does not Does not decide
910-18 (9th Cir. 2001) (per decide
curiam)
Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d Equal protection No No
791, 807 (9th Cir. 2003)
Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, Excessive force Yes Yes
531, 534-35 (4th Cir. 2003)
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Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, Free speech Yes Does not decide
261-62 (5th Cir. 2002)
Keller v. Faecher, 44 Fed. Appx. (1) Interference with (1) No (1) No
828, 831-32 (9th Cir. 2002) (mem.) medical treatment (2) Yes (2) Yes
(2) Deliberate (3) No (3) No








Khan v. Lucas, 33 Fed. Appx. 381, Substantive due No No
384-85 (10th Cir. 2002) process
Kinney v. Weaver, 301 F.3d 253, (1) Free speech (1) Yes (1) Yes
268-85 (5th Cir. 2002) (2) Due process (2) No (2) No
Klein v. Long, 275 F.3d 544, 552 Arrest without No No
(6th Cir. 2001) probable cause
Krug v. Lutz, 329 F.3d 692, 696- Procedural due Yes No
97, 699 (9th Cir. 2003) process
Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 Excessive force Yes No
F.3d 590, 601-03 (8th Cir. 2003)
Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Free exercise No No
School Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 982-83
(9th Cir. 2003)
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, (1) Wrongful arrest (1) No (1) No
1196-99 (11th Cir. 2002) (2) Excessive force (2) Yes (2) Yes
Lockridge v. Board of Trustees of Equal protection Yes Yes
the University of Arkansas, 294
F.3d 1010, 1017-18 (8th Cir. 2002)
Lockridge v. Board of Trustees of Discrimination No 0
the University of Arkansas, 315
F.3d 1005, 1012 (8th Cir. 2003) r
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Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, (1) Unreasonable (1) Yes (1) Yes
1282-93 (2d Cir. 2002) seizure (2) No (2) No
(2) Unreasonable (3) No (3) No




Mansoor v. Trank, 319 F.3d 133, Free speech Yes Yes
135-39 (4th Cir. 2003)
Marshall v. Teske, 284 F.3d 765, Arrest without Yes Yes
772 (7th Cir. 2002) probable cause
May v. Franklin County Board of Substantive due No No
Commissioners, 59 Fed. Appx. process
786, 791-94 (6th Cir. 2003)
McClendon v. City of Columbia, Substantive due No No
305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) process
(per curiam)
McKinney v. Peters, 58 Fed. Deliberate Yes Yes
Appx. 284, 285 (9th Cir. 2003) ndifference to safety
(mem.)
McNair v. Coffey, 279 F.3d 463, Excessive force No No
467-68 (7th Cir. 2002)
McTaggert v. Taylor, 48 Fed. Deliberate No No
Appx. 237, 239 (9th Cir. 2002) ndifference to safety(mem.)
Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, Failure to provide Yes No
848-49 (8th Cir. 2002) medical treatment
Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d 963, (1) Unreasonable (1) No (1) No
968-74 (7th Cir. 2003) search (2) No (2) No





Morrell v. Mock, 270 F.3d 1090, Substantive due Yes No
1094-1101 (7th Cir. 2001) process
Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d Due process Does not Does not decide
301, 303 (7th Cir. 2003) decide
Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, Free speech es es
1214 (9th Cir. 2001) 1 1Y 1Y
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Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d Excessive force No No
1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002)
Peebles v. Yamhill County, 26 Unlawful arrest No No
Fed. Appx. 643, 645 (9th Cir.
2001) (mem.)
PETA v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d Free speech Yes Yes
1198, 1207 (10th Cir. 2002)
Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 302 Excessive force Yes Yes
(6th Cir. 2002)
Pike v. Osborne, 301 F.3d 182, Free speech Yes No
184-85 (4th Cir. 2002)
Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, Substantive due Does not No
132-46 (2d Cir. 2002) process decide
Resnick v. Adams, 317 F.3d 1056, Free exercise No No
1059-63 (9th Cir. 2003)
Rivera v. Washington, 57 Fed. (1) Unreasonable (1) No (1) No
Appx. 558, 561-63 (4th Cir. 2003) search (2) No (2) No
(per curiam) (2) Excessive force
Rogers v. Clark County School Equal protection Yes Yes
District, 52 Fed. Appx. 911,912
(9th Cir. 2002) (mem.)
Rucker v. Hampton, 49 Fed. Excessive force No No
Appx. 806, 807-11 (10th Cir. 2002)
Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d Equal protection Yes No
506, 513-19 (9th Cir. 2002)
Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, Excessive force Does not Does not decide
851-56 (9th Cir. 2002) decide
Saumur v. Robles, 65 Fed. Appx. Unreasonable search No No
132, 133-34 (9th Cir. 2003) (mem.)
Seiner v. Drenon, 304 F.3d 810, Excessive force No No
812-13 (8th Cir. 2002)
Sinclair v. City of Des Moines, 268 Excessive force No No
F.3d 594, 596 (8th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam)
Smith v. Stone, 40 Fed. Appx. 197, Unreasonable search Does not No
199-200 (6th Cir. 2002) decide
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
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Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, (1) Free speech (1) Yes (1) No
969-72 (9th Cir. 2002) (2) Due process (2) No (2) No
Spencer v. Sutterfield, 66 Fed. Unreasonable search No No
Appx. 569, 572-78 (6th Cir. 2003)
(per curiam)
Stevens v. Rose, 298 F.3d 880, Arrest without Yes Yes
883-85 (9th Cir. 2002) probable cause
Stuart v. Jackson, 24 Fed. Appx. (1) Excessive force (1) No (1) No
943,952-56 (10th Cir. 2001) (2) Failure to train (2) No (2) No
Suboh v. District Attorney's Procedural due Yes Yes
Office of Suffolk District, 298 F.3d process
81, 90-98 (1st Cir. 2002)
Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d (1) Procedural due (1) No (1) No
1039, 1043-49 (9th Cir. 2002) process (2) No (2) No




Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, (1) Excessive force (1) Yes (1) Yes
1346-56 (11th Cir. 2002) (2) Substantive due (2) No (2) No
process (3) No (3) No
(3) Procedural due
process
Von Herbert v. City of St. Clair Unlawful arrest Yes Yes
Shores, 61 Fed. Appx. 133,136-37
(6th Cir. 2003)
Walker v. Disner, 50 Fed. Appx. Unreasonable search No No
908, 910 (10th Cir. 2002)
Ware v. Morrison, 276 F.3d 385, Due process No No
387 (8th Cir. 2002)
Washington v. Normandy Fire Free speech Yes Yes
Protection District, 272 F.3d 522,
526-27 (8th Cir. 2001)
Weddell v. County of Carson City, Wrongful arrest No No
60 Fed. Appx. 9, 10 (9th Cir. 2003)
(mem.)
White v. City of Markham, 310 Unreasonable seizure No No
F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2002) 1
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Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 293 Excessive force Does not Does not decide
F.3d 447,450-54 (8th Cir. 2002) decide
Wilson v. Morgan, 54 Fed. Appx. Arrest without Yes Yes
195, 197-98 (6th Cir. 2002) probable cause
Wolf v. Winlock, 34 Fed. Appx. Arrest without No No
457, 461-63 (6th Cir. 2002) probable cause
ood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, (1) Wrongful arrest. (1) No (1) No
877-83 (11th Cir. 2003) (2) Malicious (2) No (2) No
prosecution (3) No (3) No
(3) Free speech
Young v. Martin, 51 Fed. Appx. Deliberate Yes Yes
509, 513-15 (6th Cir. 2002) 1ndifference to serious
edical needs
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